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Abstract 
 
 
  Firm turnover (entry, exit and survival) inside manufacturing markets and the determinants of 
location of new ventures in a specific territory are relapsing subjects in the area of, respectively, 
Industrial Organization and Regional and Urban Economics. However, from beginnings of the nineties 
these subjects have recovered protagonism. The availability of better datasets, the advances in the 
Location  Theories  and  Industrial  Dynamics  and  the  use  of  more  sophisticated  econometric  tools 
(discrete choice, Poisson, panel data, etc.) help to explain the increasing interest of scholars in these 
subjects. This thesis project is set inside those perspectives and aims, on the one hand, to review the 
main theories and determinants that explain firm demography and, on the other hand, to explain the 
motivation and objectives for future research. The latter approaches some of the critical questions in 
this  literature  within  the  framework  of  a  developing  economy  (Argentina).  Using  such  empirical 
application constitutes a clear novelty inside an empirical literature centered in cases as Europe, North 
America or Japan, while very few empirical contributions do exist regarding countries out of these 
areas and, concretely, for developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  The process by which new firms enter into industrial markets, either grow and survive or exit 
from the industry has crucial effects on economic growth and welfare. New businesses may have 
direct and indirect effects on industry economic performance. The former relates to the new jobs or 
the new production created by new units. The latter are qualitatively and quantitative more  relevant 
and have to do with securing efficiency, stimulating productivity increase, reducing prices, creating 
new  markets,  stimulating  innovation,  increasing  the  variety  of  products  and  intensifying  labor 
division
1. These benefits are not necessarily limited to the industry to which the start-up belongs, or to 
the region in which the entry occurs. Furthermore, Acs and Amorós (2008) find that entry of new 
firms is particularly relevant for developing economies, since innovative entrepreneurship leads to 
gap-filling and input-completing activities.  
  Recent  literature  indicate  that  barriers  to  entry  facing  small  entrants  are  generally  rather 
modest, and that entry of new firms does not seem to be substantially deterred in spite of high entry 
barriers (Acs and Audretsch, 1989a and 1989b; Audretsch, 1991). These observations suggest the 
existence of substantial “barriers to survival”, which may be more important than barriers to entry 
(Geroski, 1995). These three phenomena -entry, exit and survival- are extremely related. Entry of new 
companies may induce the closing of less efficient others, at the time that firms that decide to abandon 
the market leave behind niches of unsatisfied consumers that encourage new companies to enter. In 
this process, post entry performance and survival chances play a key role.  
  While considerable progress in the knowledge about new firm formation processes have been 
made, Fritsch et al. (2006) argue that determinants of success and failure of newly founded businesses 
are still rather unclear. In particular, they point out that the available studies do not systematically 
account  for  the  regional  dimension,  despite  regional  factors  play  an  important  role  and  add 
significantly to the explanation of new business survival. Even more recently, Fritsch (2008) states 
there  is  not  still  sufficient  knowledge  about  the  ways  in  which  new  business  formation  shapes 
economic  development,  particularly  what  time  period  it  takes  until  the  effects  become  visible  in 
empirical data. This issue is indeed complex because competitive impact of the entrepreneurial efforts 
differs between countries at the same level of development (Carree et al., 2002), between countries at 
different stages of development (Wennekers et al., 2005) and also among regions in a single country 
(Acs and Armington, 2004). 
  This thesis project aims, on the one hand, to review the main theories and determinants that 
                                                 
1  See  the  special  issue  of  Small  Business  Economics  of  January  2008,  in  which  several  scholars  analyze  for 
different groups of countries how the entry of new firms affects labour market in the medium run. Among them 
there are empirical analysis for Germany (Fritsch and Mueller, 2008), Netherlands (van Stel and Suddle, 2008), 
UK (Mueller et al., 2008 ), Portugal (Baptista et al., 2008) and Spain (Arauzo et al., 2008).  - 5 - 
explain firm demography (Part 1) and, on the other hand, to explain the motivation and objectives for 
future research (Part 2). The latter will discuss firm demography in Argentina, over the period 2003-
2008.  It  will  include,  as  a  central  factor,  the  spatial  issue,  since  Argentinian  provinces  differ 
significantly in terms of mean wage, skill manufacturing activity, economic growth and other factors 
that influence their territorial competitiveness. Thus, we should be able to identify the influences on 
the success, failure and survival of newly founded establishments that are specific to the particular 
industry, region and period of time. To our knowledge, such a study has not yet been done. This 
constitutes a clear novelty inside an empirical literature centered in cases as Europe, North America or 
Japan, while very few empirical contributions do exist regarding countries out of these areas and, 
concretely, for developing countries. 
   We begin Part 1 with a synthesis of the main theories of firm demography that are developed 
in next sections. Section 2 describes different forms of entry and exit, as well as the most widely used 
indicators of firm demography, stating their strong and weak points. In Sections 3 and 4, we briefly 
expose the main theories and determinants that explain, respectively, firm entry and exit processes. In 
Section  5  we  discuss  the  relationship  between  both  phenomena,  and  consider  three  alternative 
hypothesis that link them: independence, symmetry and simultaneity. A review of the main empirical 
evidence related is also done. Section 6 deals with firm survival, its determinants and the methods 
utilized. In Section 7 we discuss in detail the influence that regional and urban factors have in firm 
demography. Part 2 describes the objectives for future research. As firm demography has been fairly 
more documented in developed countries than in developing ones, in Section 1 we argue why results 
may differ between them. In Section 2, empirical research about firm demography in developing 
countries is exposed, while Section 3 briefly describes firm demography processes in the Argentinian 
recent years. In Section 4, aims and future lines of research are shown and, finally, Section 5 explains 
the available statistical sources.  
 
 
 
 
 - 6 - 
PART 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1. Presentation  
 
  The process by which new firms enter into industrial markets, either grow and survive or exit 
from the industry has fundamental effects on economic growth and welfare. New businesses may have 
direct and indirect effects on industry economic performance. The former relates to the new jobs or 
the new production created by new units at the start of business operations. These firms represent an 
entry of new capacities into the market and are, therefore, an essential element of the market process. 
However, the most important influence that the start-ups have on growth and employment occurs 
rather indirectly on the supply side. These indirect effects relate to; i) securing efficiency, stimulating 
productivity  increase  or  low  prices  by  contesting  established  market  positions
2;  ii)  accelerating 
structural  change,  generated  by  entries  of  new  firms  joined  by  exits  of  old-established  ones;  iii) 
creating  new  markets  and  stimulating  innovation,  since  many  radical  innovations  have  been 
introduced by new firms, since incumbents may imitate innovations made by new firms or since 
incumbents are also stimulated to innovate themselves; iv) increasing the variety of products and 
problem solutions; v) intensifying labor division, which is stimulated by an increased variety of new 
supplies; vi) destroying jobs in the least competitive incumbent (Geroski, 1995; Fritsch, 2008; van 
Stel and Suddle, 2008)
3. These effects are not necessarily limited to the industry to which the start-up 
belongs, or to the region in which the entry occurs and may be particularly important for developing 
countries (Acs and Amorós, 2008).  
  However, these effects may be overestimated. For example, Geroski (1995, p.437) concludes 
that: “entry is generally a poor substitute for active rivalry amongst incumbent firms in a market. 
Entry can be too slow, too small scale and too erratic to matter much in many circumstances. The pro-
competitive effects of entry seem to be easy to exaggerate”. Acs et al. (1994) uncover a negative 
relationship between entrepreneurship and economic development, that persists after controlling for a 
number  of  other  factors.  Likewise,  with  regard  to  employment,  if  firms  with  relatively  high 
productivity remain in the market while those with a low productivity reduce their output or exit, the 
market selection process may lead to a decline in employment, because fewer resources are needed in 
order to produce a given amount of goods and services at a higher productivity level (Fritsch, 2008). 
This author concludes that we still do not have sufficient knowledge about the ways in which new 
                                                 
2  Baumol (1982) argues that not only the actual entry but also the very possibility of an entry forces the incumbents 
to perform more efficiently. 
3  Most of these indirect effects implicitly refer to Schumpeter´s idea of creative destruction, which he defines as the 
essential  fact  about  capitalism.  (Schumpeter,  1942,  p.83:  “The  fundamental  impulse  that  sets  and  keeps  the 
capitalist  engine  in  motion  comes  from  the  new  consumers'  goods,  the  new  methods  of  production  or 
transportation, the new markets...” [This process] “incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, 
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.”). - 7 - 
business formation shapes economic development, particularly what time period it takes until the 
effects become visible in empirical data.  
  Forty  years  ago,  limit  price  hypothesis  were  dominant  among  the  theories  of  entry  and, 
consequently, entry barriers were the main factors used to explain market evolution. Attention focused 
almost exclusively on quantifying barriers to entry, rather than on measuring entry itself. This focus 
was related to static models, which interest centered on potential rather to actual entry (Bain, 1956; 
Bhagwati, 1970; Baumol, 1982). Besides, they were based on the assumption of a representative 
firm
4. However, there have been some attempts to quantify the firm-turnover process. On the one 
hand, there are studies that covered a small number of industries (Mansfiled, 1962; Carroll and Vogel, 
1987). On the other hand, other studies attempt to measure the intensity of entry for a cross-section of 
industries. Nonetheless, they rely on data that were generated for other purposes and in many cases 
can  not  distinguish  between  entry  and  exit  (Orr,  1974;  Deutsch,  1975). As  a  result,  they  yield 
estimates of entry and exit that are imprecise or less than comprehensive (Baldwin and Gorecki, 
1991).  
  In the 1970s and 1980s, models of strategic competition came into prominence. Researchers 
base on game theory, especially non cooperative games, to explain decisions of firms to enter, remain 
or  exit  a  market,  depending  on  their  incentives.  This  new  framework  incorporate  the  dynamic 
dimension as well as the informative asymmetries (Tirole, 1990). 
  It is only in the early nineties that actual entry has attracted much attention in the empirical 
side of the industrial organization literature and that national data bases have been used. The use of 
more sophisticated econometric tools -discrete choice, Poisson, panel data, etc.- also helps to explain 
the increasing interest of scholars in these subjects. Many empirical studies about entry are developed 
and summarized in Geroski (1995). The theoretical models related to recent empirical studies may be 
divided into three groups: a) learning by doing models, such as Jovanovic´s (1982), Frank´s (1988) 
and Ericson and Pakes´ (1989) b) evolutionary models which suppose an imperfect knowledge of the 
environment, namely Nelson and Winter (1982) and Audretsch (1995b) and c) theories of industry life 
cycle (Agarwal and Gort, 1996; Klepper, 1996).  
  The  main  factors  used  to  explain  entry  are:  firm  size  and  age,  barriers  to  entry  -product 
differentiation, absolute cost advantages, scale economies, vertical integration, limit pricing, excess 
capacity, strategic use of distribution systems and predatory prices-, capital requirements, research and 
development (R+D) intensity, past profit rate, past rate of industry growth, level of risk, stage of life 
industry cycle, market concentration and technological regime.  
                                                 
4  The argument in neoclassical economic theory is not that firms are all alike. Rather, the position is that differences 
are not discretionary, but reflect differences in the contexts in which firms operate (Nelson, 1991). Thus, firms are 
forced to be different. In contrast, evolutionary theory rejects the concept of representative firm. It proposes that 
differences between  firms are discretionary and they  manifest in their strategy, their  structure and their core 
capabilities. - 8 - 
  In regard to the exiting process, despite its relevance, there are relatively less studies referred 
to firm exit than firm entry. This phenomena is analyzed since the late sixties (Marcus, 1967) and the 
greatest impediment to measuring the shares of exiting establishments is the lack of longitudinal data 
bases that identify the actual closure date of businesses. In addition, studies about firm exit may be 
less consistent, because of the time that passes by between the exit decision and the actual exit -
because  of  the  intention of  recovering  the  sunk costs-. The main  factors behind the  exit  process 
mentioned in the literature are: the level of profits, barriers to exit -scale economies and sunk costs, 
such  as  advertising,  R+D  investments  or  capital  intensity-,  firm  age  and  size,  industry  growth, 
technological regime, stage of the industry life cycle, degree of industry concentration, gross entry and 
non-economic factors. The methods and techniques are similar to the ones used in firm entry research. 
   On the other hand, firm survival has been first dealt with as a side issue to firm growth, since 
only surviving  firms are able to grow
5.  Later, it also becomes a side issue in the entry and exit 
literature, survival being the inevitable in-between stage. If entry barriers could be more effectively 
justified as barriers to survival, this would help to reconcile the repeated occurrence of suboptimal 
entry with the presence of high entry barriers, and the often recorded positive correlation between 
entry and exit rates across industries (Geroski, 1995). Finally, in the 1990s survival establishes its 
independent position in the literature, giving rise to a considerable amount of empirical research. 
Audretsch (1991), essentially deploying explanatory variables defined at the industry level, finds that 
industry concentration, capital intensity and economies of scale all have a negative effect on new firm 
survival, thus supporting the idea that entry barriers are more effective as barriers to survival. In 
contrast,  industry  growth  reduces  the  cost  disadvantage,  enhancing  survival  prospects.  As 
concentrating the analysis entirely at the industry level is recognized as a limitation, firm-specific 
variables are subsequently introduced: start-up size, firm growth, stage of industry life-cycle, capital 
intensity, technology employed, industry’s innovation rate, financial structure and ownership status. In 
the middle nineties, macroeconomic conditions, firm strategy and  individual characteristics of the 
entrepreneurs are also considered. 
  Regional  factors  have  been  more  recently  included
6  as  determinants  of  firm  demography. 
About twenty years ago, a substantial literature in regional economics tried to identify the geographic 
specific  characteristics  which  induce  new-firm  start  ups.  However,  this  literature  has  produced  a 
number of ambiguous results (Audretsch and Fritsch, 1999). These authors show that this owes to the 
omission that the link between geographic specific factors and the propensity to start new firms varies 
from industry to industry. Arauzo et al. (2010) find that the basic analytical framework has remained 
                                                 
5  Joint estimations of survival and growth have been used to overcome the selectivity-bias problem. 
6  See for example the collection of country studies included in the special issue of Regional Studies on Regional 
Variations in New Firm Formation, edited by Paul Reynolds et al. (1994a), as well as Audretsch and Fritsch 
(1994a,b) and Fritsch (1992) for Germany, and the survey by Storey (1991). - 9 - 
unaltered since the early contributions of the 1980´s, while, in contrast, there have advances in the 
quality of the data and in the econometric modeling. There are basically two ways to assess which 
factors  affect  entry  decision  into  an  specific  location:  i)  examining  location  decisions  from  the 
viewpoint  of  the  agent  that  makes  the  choice  or,  alternatively,  ii)  assessing  the  issue  from  the 
viewpoint of the chosen territory. In the former case, factors related to the agent taking the decision -
size, sector, etc.- and those related to the set of alternatives -population, infrastructures, etc.- are 
considered  and  the  unit  of  analysis  is  the  establishment.  In  the  latter,  the  unit  of  analysis  is 
geographical -municipality, city, province, region, etc.- and the main objective is to analyze which 
characteristics  of  a  territory  affect  the  average  number  of  new  concerns  that  are  created  therein 
(Arauzo et al., 2010). There are also two alternative geographical units considered: the regional and 
the urban ones. The former refers to broader areas like provinces or regions where there are multiple 
relationships among firms, public institutions and individuals, while the later refers to smaller units 
(usually cities) where density of economic activity is considerably higher. 
 
1.2. Measurements and approaches  
 
  There is no an unique concept of entry and exit and there are also different indicators to 
describe processes of firm demography. At least five different forms of entry can be distinguished: i) 
newly created firms; ii) entry by an existing firm that builds a new plant in the industry; iii) entry by 
an existing firm that purchases a plant or firm already existing in the industry; iv) entry by an existing 
firm that alters the product mix in an existing plant; v) entry by a foreign-owned firm in one of the 
above  ways  (Mueller,  1991,  in Audretsch,  1995a)
7.  There  are  different  forms  of  exit  as  well:  i) 
voluntarily exit; ii) bankruptcy; iii) merger; iv) purchase by another firm.  
  In  particular,  Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI)  is  specially  relevant  in  firm  demography 
processes of developing countries. Foreign firms may entry mainly through four kinds of modes: 
greenfield investments, acquisitions, mergers and joint ventures. In the former case, the transaction 
involves mainly newly created assets that come under control of the foreign firms
8, while in the 
second and third cases, the transaction implies just a transfer of existing assets from local firms -
mergers  occur  when  the  assets  and  operation  of  firms  from  different  countries  are  combined  to 
establish a new legal identity, and acquisitions occur when the control of assets and operations is 
                                                 
7  Bain (1956) defines an entry as the combination of two events: a) the establishment of an independent legal entity, 
new to the industry, as a producer therein; and b) the introduction by the new firm of physical production capacity 
that was not used previously for production in the industry. This definition excludes the acquisition of existing 
producing capacity (changes of ownership) and the expansion of capacity by an established firm. 
8  However, greenfield investment does not necessarily reflect the acquisition of new fixed assets, since it includes 
all financial transfers from a multinational’s headquarters to its subsidiary -and back-. (Calderón et al., 2004) - 10 - 
transferred from a local (affiliate) to a foreign company
9-. The latter mode involves newly created 
assets which are financed and controlled jointly by foreign and domestic firms. 
  The  causes  of  the  FDI  may  be  divided  into  push  factors  -declining  real  interest  rates  in 
industrial economies- and pull factors -the characteristics of investment environment in developing 
countries, the decision to privatize state enterprises, etc-. While the theoretical literature points out that 
FDI may boost growth, both by raising aggregate investment and through technological spillovers, the 
empirical literature shows considerable disagreement, both at firm and at macroeconomic level
10.  
  Thus,  a  critical  point  is  the  role  of  foreign  companies  in  local  firm  demography  and 
performance. Despite the integration into global production networks or global value chains (GVC) 
has  been  a  key  catching-up  mechanism  for  several  developing  countries,  this  integration  is  not 
homogeneous.  The  GVC  approach
11  explains  the  reasons  for  this  heterogeneity. As  indicated  by 
Kosacoff and López (2008), being part of a CGV is not, a priori, a positive aspect from the standpoint 
of long-term firm competitiveness or countries´ economic development. Such participation must be 
accompanied by a set of factors that stimulate the upgrading of local firms and enable them to absorb 
the  potential  benefits  of  the  relationships  within  these  chains. Amsdem  et  al.  (2001)  argue  that 
different contexts lead to different possibilities of upgrading. Thus, in countries like Singapore there 
was a transition from OEMs contracts (original equipment manufacturer), where the local firm aims to 
low  costs  and  produces  a  good  entirely  designed  by  the  transnational  firm,  to  an  ODM  scheme 
(original design manufacturer), where even though the basic design of the product is still done by the 
transnational firm, local companies integrate parts and components and perform some  design, in order 
to lower costs and reduce time to market. Finally, in the OBM contracts (original brand manufacturer) 
the local firm not only deals with the design as a whole but also with marketing. 
  However, this processes are not automatic: the upgrading possibilities depends i) on the type 
of chain governance
12 in which firms participate, and ii) on the local conditions. On the one hand, 
Humphrey  and  Schmitz  (2000)  argue  that  in  chains  where  leaders  focus  on  knowledge-intensive 
activities,  and  only  transmit  the  technical  requirements  to  their  suppliers  (quasi-hierarchy),  the 
exchange of intangible assets that stimulates the learning process of local firms is limited (and thus the 
types of upgrading observed are more related to products and processes). In contrast, in horizontal 
structures closest to networks, cooperative relations between firms are common. On the other hand, 
                                                 
9  In Latin America, the rise in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) in the 90s is largely driven by privatization of 
public enterprises. Calderón et al. (2004) mention that, in this region, M&A accounted for over 50% of total FDI 
inflows in 2001-02 and that mergers represent only 3% of world M&A in 1999.  
10 Calderón et al. (2004) pp. 3-4, expose several studies that account for the evidence of FDI impact at both levels. 
11 Main references of this literature include: Gereffi (1994), Kaplinsky (1998), Humphrey and Schmitz (2000), 
Gereffi and Kaplinsky (2001) and Gereffi et al. (2005). 
12 Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) distinguish different types of chains, focusing on the way they are coordinated. 
They suggest that there is a continuum from arm’s-length market relationships through to hierarchical governance 
(vertical  integration).  In  between,  there  are  networks,  that  bring  together  partners  with  complementary 
competences, and quasi hierarchy, in which there is asymmetry of  competence and power in favour of one party. - 11 - 
upgrading depends also on local conditions: macroeconomic and institutional stability, public policies, 
human capital, clusters, technological and absorptive capabilities of domestic firms, the characteristics 
of  national  systems  of  innovation  and  the  availability  of  infrastructure,  among  other  factors 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000; Gereffi et al. 2005; Giuliani et al. 2005; Morrison et al. 2006).  
  There are also several measures of entry and exit, and results are not neutral to them. Number 
of entries and exits have to be normalized in order to make comparisons between different areas. So, 
we  may  use  several  approaches:  a)  the  one  related  to  labor  market,  if  the  denominator  used  to 
normalize is the number of workers or active population, b) the one related to the population, if the 
denominator is total population, c) and the ecological approach, if the divisor is the total number of 
firms.  
  The first approach is based on the assumption that new firms are created by people living in 
the same area, while the second one supposes entrepreneurs found companies inside the labor market 
from which they come and in which they have a previous experience as employees (Audretsch and 
Fritsch, 1994b). The ecological approach is the most widely used and it is related to the idea that new 
firms arise from the incumbents or as a result of them
13 (spin outs). According to it, the gross entry 
rate is defined as the number of new firms divided by the total number of incumbent and entrant firms 
producing in that year
14. However, this rate does not account for the mean firm size, nor the new firms 
or the incumbents. The solution consists in dis-aggregating the entry rate by size, in order to determine 
the entry rate in each stratum. This enables us to compare between areas dominated by larger firms or 
by small and medium establishments.  
  Garofoli (1991) suggests some critics against this indicator. In the first instance, there are 
structural  differences  between  new  enterprises  -generally  small-  and  incumbents.  There  are  also 
structural  differences  between  establishments  of  different  economic  sectors  or  regions,  and  the 
comparisons between them may tend to misleading results. In addition, this indicator assumes a casual 
relationship between stock of firms and birth. Moreover, as the denominator is usually small -specially 
at a sectoral or regional level-, entry rate may be large, even though the number of entries is low.
  Besides, Ashcroft et al. (1991) mention that this indicator mirrors the previous entry rate, so 
that, if a region had a low entry rate in the past, it would show an artificial rise in the current entry 
rate. Finally, Audretsch (1995a) states that measuring the change in the number of firms does not 
account for enterprises that exited from the industry during the relevant period.  
  Symmetrically, the gross exit rate is defined as the number of exits divided by the total 
                                                 
13 Empirical  evidence  about  the  importance  of  small  firms  as  “incubators”  for  new  firm  founders  in  the 
manufacturing sector is found in Fothergill and Gudgin (1982), and of large firms in business and professional 
services in Keeble et al. (1992).  
14 The concepts of “new” and “incumbent” establishments do not lend themselves to obvious measurement either. A 
new establishment may be defined alternatively as an establishment younger than one, two or four years old. By 
contrast, incumbent firms are defined as those firms more than ten or fifteen years old, or alternatively as the total 
number of firms in the current period. All these definitions are certainly arbitrary (Audretsch, 1995a). - 12 - 
number of incumbent and entrant firms producing in that year. Besides, the most common measure of 
entry used in studies attempting to empirically identify the determinants of entry has been the net 
entry rate, that is, the change in the number of firms over a given period (Audretsch, 1995a). It equals 
the difference between the gross entry rate and gross exit rate. The sum of these two rates gives the 
rate of rotation or firm turnover, which is a global measure about the flows of entry and exit. In 
addition, Audretsch (1995a, p.157) introduces a measure of relative exit by ages, defined as the sum 
of the number of exiting establishments between the ages of t1 and t2, over the total number of exiting 
establishments. The rate may be also calculated by economic sectors.  
  An  alternative  indicator  is  the  rate  of  entry  penetration,  that  is  the  gross 
sales/employees/investment by entrants divided by total industry sales/employees/investment. At last, 
the rate of volatility takes into account structural factors, such as technology, specific assets, R+D 
investment, etc., and has an inverse relationship with the level of entry and exit barriers. It is defined 
as the difference between the rate of rotation and the absolute value of the net entry rate.  
 
1.3. Firm entry: literature review and empirical evidence 
 
  In this Section, we expose a synthesis of the main theories and determinants that explain firm 
entry and exit processes. We begin with traditional theories, based on limit price hypothesis, and 
afterward, more recent theories are explained: a) learning by doing models, b) evolutionary models 
which suppose an imperfect knowledge of the environment
15 and c) industry life cycle models. In 
every case, we explain the basic model, we expose the main factors used to explain entry and we 
review the empirical evidence. Later on, we synthesize the stylized facts about entry summed up by 
Geroski  (1995)  and  others.  Finally,  we  analyze  the  motives  to  start  a  firm,  both  from  an 
entrepreneurship and an industrial organization perspective (Shapero, 1983). 
  Traditional theories are based on limit price theory and link entry rate to industry profitability, 
growth  and  structural  barriers  to  entry.  In  spite  of  the  numerous  studies  developed  under  this 
framework,  many  of  the  questions  about  the  process  of  entry  remained  unanswered  (Audretsch, 
1995a)  and  the  resulting  empirical  evidence  was  ambiguous  and  not  conclusive.  So  that,  in  the 
nineties, additional theories which recognize firm heterogeneity and dynamic issues are considered. 
The availability of better national data bases and the use of more sophisticated econometric tools let 
introduce another variables as well. 
 
The traditional theories 
                                                 
15 We do not expose the characteristics of  models of strategic competition, developed in the 1970s and 1980s, 
because of their theoretical nature and the relatively less empirical studies related. - 13 - 
 
  As initial studies about entry are based on limit price theory, entry barriers are the main factors 
used by these authors to explain market evolution. Both Bain (1949) and Sylos (Modigliani, 1958) 
describe the entry limiting price as the maximum to which price can be raised above the competitive 
level without attracting entry. Since the limit price is function of the level of entry barriers and it 
implies a certain rate of return, cross section differences in long run profit rates can be, at least partly, 
attributed to differences in the level of entry barriers. Thus, attention focuses almost exclusively on 
quantifying barriers to entry, rather than on measuring entry itself. For instance, Bain (1956) examines 
20 United States manufacturing industries and concludes that the most significant barriers to entry are 
product differentiation, economies of scale in plant or firm and control of patents or scarce resources, 
respectively
16. Other econometric investigations of entry barriers in the sixties (Comanor and Wilson, 
1967; Miller, 1969) are also indirect tests. They regress the profit rate, rather than entry, on those 
structural characteristics considered to be entry barriers. 
  Despite the emphasis on potential rather than actual entry, there have been some attempts to 
quantify the firm-turnover process. On the one hand there are studies that cover a small number of 
industries (Mansfiled, 1962; Carroll and Vogel, 1987). On the other hand, there are other papers that 
measure the intensity of entry for a cross-section of industries. Many of these studies (Orr, 1974; 
Deutsch, 1975) have had to rely on data that were generated for other purposes, have only the gross 
number of firms or cannot distinguish between entry and exit and, consequently, yield estimates of 
entry and exit that are imprecise or less than comprehensive (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1991). 
  Among these early studies that account for variations in entry in strict sense, one of the most 
relevant is Orr´s (1974). He presumes that entry is a positive function of the difference between 
observed and entry limiting profit rates, and a positive function of the expected rate of growth of 
industry output (Q): 
  E = f(πp – π*, Q)                  [1]  
where πp is the past industry profit rate -proxy of observed profit rate- and π* is the long run profit rate 
predicted for this industry on the basis of the level of entry barriers. This rate depends on capital 
requirements, advertising intensity, research and development intensity, market share of minimum 
effective size (MES) plant, risk and concentration. Q is the expected rate of growth of industry output. 
  It is only twenty years ago that actual entry has attracted much attention in the empirical side 
of the industrial organization literature. Studies using national data bases have emerged in the early 
nineties as well. At that time, Geroski (1991b) extends Orr´s model, assuming that entry is a function 
of the incentives to enter relative to the level of entry barriers: 
                                                 
16 Mann´s  study  (1966)  on  30  of  the  United  States  manufacturing  industries,  does  not  examine  the  relative 
importance of the various entry barriers and Mansfield´s  (1962) sample is limited to four industries. Capital 
requirements is the only barrier considered. - 14 - 
  E = β (π
e – F) + µ                  [2] 
where E is entry into some industry at a period of time, π
e is expected post-entry profits, F is the costs 
of  entry  and  β  is  a  parameter  which  measures  the  speed  of  entry  in  response  to  profitable 
opportunities
17. F measures the level of profits at which entry is cut off, the level of “limit profits” and 
[2] is often used to generate estimates of the height of barriers to entry.  
  In other words, the main determinants of entry used in the initial models include: i) current, 
past or expected profit rate, ii) barriers to entry, iii) current, past or expected rate of growth of industry 
output, iv) industry concentration and v) risk
18. In the next paragraphs we briefly describe each one of 
them. 
  With regard to the first determinant, from the empirical literature on entry surveyed by Geroski 
(1995) emerge that entry seems to be slow to react to high profit rates. That is, most of the estimates 
of β are rather small and imprecisely measured. This suggests that differences in profits between 
industries would have to be much larger than we observe them to be to account for observed inter-
industry differences in entry. Geroski (1995) says that it may be a consequence of mis-measuring 
either π
e or F, or of specification error, since most studies assume that β is the same in all industries. A 
small amount of work using extrapolative or rational expectations predictors of π
e produce much 
larger and more precise estimates of β.  
  Some studies estimate that, on average, incumbents are able to maintain prices above their 
average costs in the long run, without attracting serious competition from new entrant firms. Besides, 
the height of these limit profits -the value of π
e at which E goes to zero in equation [1]- varies 
considerable between industries. These differences in profitability between industries are extremely 
stable and persistent, meaning that most of the variation in profitability across industries and over time 
is “between” industry variation. On the other hand, differences in entry rates between industries are 
unstable and do not persist for very long, meaning that entry exhibits far more “within” industry 
variation than profits (Geroski, 1995). Consequently, to explain profitability, one needs to identify 
stable structural features of markets that vary across industries but not over time, such as barriers to 
entry. Conversely, to explain entry, one needs to identify much more transitory, time-varying features 
that do not necessarily differ across industries. 
  Orr (1974) introduces the average level of the past industry profit rate as a measure of the 
observed profit rate. The profit rate is defined as the sum of net income and interest payments over 
                                                 
17 Expected post-entry profits have been proxied by lagged profitability or by some determinants of profitability, 
such as current period growth rates or industry concentration. F has usually been proxied as a linear function of a 
number  of  observable  proxies  for  barriers  of  entry,  like  capital  intensity,  advertising  intensity  or  minimum 
efficient scale.  
18 Other determinants of entry omitted by Orr (1974) because of the difficulty of quantifying include: the slope of 
the long run average cost curve generated by plants below MES, the impact of entry on factor prices, the degree of 
excess  productive  capacity,  industry  demand  elasticities,  marketing  arrangements  (franchising),  particular 
government regulations and programs or purchasing policies. - 15 - 
total assets. However, these profits may be an inadequate proxy for the profit rate an entrant could 
expect to earn, because it may be due to rents from unreproducible factors or temporary market 
conditions. Additional problems arise if firms within the same industry as well as across industries 
employ different accounting concepts and procedures. 
  The level of industry profitability was found to have only a weak positive impact on entry in 
studies by Orr (1974) and Deutsch (1984), whereas Khemani and Shapiro (1986) find past profits to 
be a strong determinant of entry
19. And five of the six country studies contained in Geroski and 
Schwalbach (1991) find a positive link between industry profitability and entry. 
  The main entry barriers analyzed in the literature are: product differentiation, absolute cost 
advantages, scale economies -minimum effective size-, vertical integration, strategic barriers -limit 
pricing,  excess  capacity,  strategic  use  of  distribution  systems  and  predatory  prices-,  research  and 
development intensity and legal barriers. 
1.  The first three ones are initially analyzed by Bain (1956). Product differentiation forces the 
entrant to make extra outlays in order to offset the “goodwill” assets of the incumbent firms -
for  example,  by  making  higher  sales  promotion  outlays  or  accepting  a  lower  price-. 
Advertising outlays are made not only to raise the limit price and shift outward the advertiser´s 
own demand curve, but also to decrease the elasticity of demand facing the new firm and 
shrink  its  demand  curve.  Examples  include  the  proliferation  of  brands  to  fill  the  various  
niches in consumer´s preference spaces and leave no viable ones for entrants, and the use of 
restrictive arrangements with the distribution sector that leave the entrant with less effective or 
economical channels (Caves and Porter, 1977). This barrier may be proxied by advertising 
intensity. 
2.  Established  firms  may  have  absolute  cost  advantages  over  potential  entrant  firms.  In 
particular: a) incumbents can have price or other advantages over entrants in purchasing or 
securing  productive  factors  or  investible  funds,  for  example  through  resource  ownership, 
qualified personnel or agreements with suppliers, b) entry of an added firm may have effects 
on the going level of the factors prices, or c) established firms may have preferred access to 
productive  techniques,  for  instance,  through  patents  or  know-how.  Initial  capital 
requirements may be included in this category as well. 
3.  Significant economies to scale tend to impede entry, because the larger the minimum effective 
size (MES), the more an entrant´s output will depress industry price, given any elasticity of 
industry  demand
20.  Thus,  larger  MES  increase  the  ability  of  existing  firms  to  raise  price 
                                                 
19 While Orr (1974) use net entry as the dependent variable, the dependent variable in Khemani and Shapiro (1986) 
is de novo gross plant entry, net of exit, plant openings by incumbents, mergers and diversification. 
20 This is only one aspect of economies of scale in production. The other aspect, the degree to which average 
production costs are elevated at lower output levels, could not be included by Orr due to data limitations. - 16 - 
without making entry profitable. This is the fundamental barrier to entry considered by Sylos 
(Modigliani, 1958). MES is defined as the smallest plant size in a given industry consistent 
with profitable operations in a year of normal economic activity and it is frequently measured 
by the median plant size of the industry. Capital requirements, that is the cost of fixed capital 
required to establish a plant of minimally effective size, may be also included in this category. 
   
These barriers may be also interrelated: investments that augment product differentiation and 
absolute cost barriers to entry can either increase the fixity of costs or shift the production 
function to display greater diseconomies of small scale (Caves and Porter, 1977). Either effect 
impairs the cost position of the small firm -entrant or incumbent- relative to the large one. 
4.  Caves  and  Porter  (1977)  consider  also  vertical  integration  as  another  barrier-raising 
investment,  although  it  cuts  across  the  others.  When  going  firms  integrate,  they  pose  a 
dilemma for the newcomer considering entry at either stage. If he enters unintegrated, he faces 
an extra uncertainty, and if he enters integrated, he faces an augmented capital cost entry 
barrier. That is, either his mean expected profit rate falls, or its variance increases.  
5.  According to the strategy of limit pricing, the incumbent chooses higher of monopoly output 
levels pre-entry in the hope of deterring entrants
21. That is, the established firm fixes -or 
threatens to fix- a price so low that the entrant cannot afford the entry costs. This strategy is 
narrowly related with the height of the entry barriers, since the higher the barriers, the higher 
may be the price.  
6.  Excess  capacity  represents  an  entry-discouraging  investment.  Unused  production  capacity 
makes credible a threat of price warfare against entrant firms. Although buying off the entrant 
is both less illegal and less costly, it increases the likelihood of future entry (Caves and Porter, 
1977). Another type of investments in excess capacity is the acquisition by going firms of 
control over scarce deposits of an input resource or enlarge a firm´s retaliatory power.  
7.  The strategy of predatory prices may be carried out by an incumbent which reduces its prices 
in an attempt to destroy its rivals or to deter new entry.  
8.  The chief component of the barrier of research and development (R+D) intensity is the 
extent of economies of scale in the R+D process. The second major factor is the accumulation 
of patents and know-how on the part of incumbent firms (Mueller and Tilton, 1969). 
9.  There may be also legal barriers, which are exogenous and block the entry of new firms.  
  Despite econometric estimates suggest that entry barriers are high (Geroski, 1995), not 
                                                 
21 If economies of scale require entrants to achieve at least a  minimum  market  share, and if they believe that 
incumbents will not change their pre-entry output levels post-entry (the Sylos Postulate), then the incumbent will 
choose a pre-entry output level that ensure non positive post-entry profits for the entrant. The Sylos Postulate 
states that no matters the production capacity of the incumbent, the new firm expects that after his entry, the 
incumbent will use his whole capacity. - 17 - 
all are used as often or in the same situations. The response by incumbents to entry is selective 
and they attack entrants in a variety of ways using a variety of tools
22, but it may be hard to 
distinguish empirically one attitude from another. For example, an established firm may use 
the strategy of limit pricing, and, alternatively, it may also ignore entrants, at least until they 
are  well  established. The  latter makes  sense  if  one  consider  that most  entry  attempts are 
doomed to failure and most entrants take five or ten years before they are able to compete 
with the incumbents. The hypothesis of no acting predicts that incumbents will not change 
their output or advertising post-entry from levels that prevail pre-entry. The problem is that it 
is hard to distinguish empirically this attitude from the strategy of limit pricing, which is a 
fairly aggressive response to entry, that occurs prior to entry.    
  Caves and Porter (1977) argue that none of the structural sources of entry barriers, 
advanced by Bain as purely exogenous, is immune to change through incumbent´s actions. 
These actions affect both entrant´s conjectures about industry conditions following his entry 
and  the  barriers  to  entry.  Thus,  the  entry  barriers  are  partly  structural  but  at  least  partly 
endogenous. 
  Entry barriers may also be seen as a collective capital good, since an investment in 
entry deterrence generally protects not just the investor but his oligopolistic rivals as well. 
That is, if entry barriers generate joint profits for the going firms, without collusion incumbent 
firms will invest less in entry barriers that the amount that maximizes joint monopoly profits. 
Thus, it raises special problems for the form and the extent of collusion. 
  The  evidence  suggests  that  entry  is  apparently  not  substantially  deterred  or  even 
deterred at all in capital intensive industries in which scale economies play an important 
role
23 (Austin and Rosembaum, 1990; Siegfried and Evans, 1992). Acs and Audretsch (1990, 
1989a and  1989b)  find  that even  small  firms are  not  significantly  deterred  from  entering 
industries  that  are  relatively  capital  intensive.  Besides,  other  empirical  studies  show  that 
predatory  prices  and  the  strategic  use  of  capacity  are  used  rather  infrequently  by 
incumbents to deter entry
24. As a consequence, entry seems to have only modest effects on 
average industry price-cost margins (Geroski, 1995). Instead, the strategic use of distribution 
systems,  signing  long  term  contracts  with  buyers,  advertising,  R+D,  patent  protection, 
learning curve strategies, space packing (for instance, filling all viable market niches with a 
                                                 
22 See Geroski (1991b), chapters 4 and 5 for a survey. 
23 It contrasts with Bain (1956) who finds that the second most important barriers are economies of scale in plant or 
firm. 
24 Geroski (1995) mentions some work that has tried to test the presence of limiting pricing -which in general has 
produce ambiguous results-: Hannan (1979); Masson and Shaanan (1982); Sengupta et al. (1983); Yamawaki 
(1985); Lieberman (1988). He argues that studies of the strategic use of excess capacity to block entry have also 
produced  weak  evidence  on  its  importance:  Lieberman  (1987);  Hilke  (1984);  Masson  and  Shaanan  (1986); 
Reynolds (1986). - 18 - 
customized version of the basic product) or hiding profits are considered more important and 
more frequently used. These strategies may differ between countries and depend on the type 
of  market  defended  -new  markets  or  established  ones-  (Singh  et  al.,  1991;  Cubbin  and 
Domberger,  1988;  Biggadike,  1976).  This  suggests,  accordingly  to  Bain  (1956),  that 
advertising may be an important barrier to entry, since heavy advertising makes entry more 
difficult for many new firms. 
  Another variable used to measure the incentive to enter is the past rate of growth of industry 
product, since past industry profit rate may not be a fully adequate proxy for the profit rate expected 
by the entrant. It is also a proxy for the expected rate of growth of industry output. Ceteris paribus, the 
higher the rate of growth of industry output, the less an entrant´s supply will depress industry price 
and output. Similarly, the more new customers coming into the market, the lower the selling expense 
of attracting customers. Besides, higher rates of growth enable incumbent firms to raise prices and to 
induce more entry, or else raise expectations about future profits. Entry rates are found to be positively 
influenced by industry growth rates (Geroski and Schwalbach, 1991).  
  Besides, in highly concentrated industries, the potential entrant must consider the possibility 
that the established firms may collude to thwart his entry. In empirical studies, industry concentration 
levels display mixed and often rather imprecisely estimated effects on entry (Geroski, 1995). This is 
surprising because most scholars expect to uncover a negative correlation between concentration and 
entry.  
  Finally, risk may be measured ideally as the standard deviation of firm profit rates across the 
industry, as well as the standard deviation of the firm profit rate over time. For any expected profit 
rate, as the deviation increases the incentive to enter decreases.  
 
The recent theories 
 
  Little consensus has emerged of the studies trying to link industry profitability, growth and 
structural barriers to entry rate (Geroski, 1995). Empirical evidence in support of the traditional model 
is ambiguous and studies developed under this framework could not answer many of the questions 
about the process of entry (Audretsch, 1995a). Perhaps one reason for this trouble is the inherently 
static  model  used  to  capture  an  inherently  dynamic  process  (Neumann,  1993,  pp.  593-594).  In 
addition,  entry  rates  are  hard  to  explain  using  conventional  measures  of  profitability  and  entry 
barriers. Geroski (1995) mentions that only a very modest amount of the variation in entry across 
industries in a single year has been accounted for by use of a model like [2]. Furthermore, the degree 
of explanation achieved in studies of entry over time or by using panel data models or autoregressive 
models of entry do not provide much of an improved fit. Transitory variations in the unobserved 
factors summarized by µ seem to account for far more of the variation in entry than variations in - 19 - 
observables, such as π
e or F.   
  So that, in the nineties, jointly with the availability of better national data bases and the use of 
more sophisticated econometric tools -discrete choice, Poisson, panel data, etc.-, other variables are 
considered.  Besides,  firm  heterogeneity  is  recognized,  since  just  imitating  incumbents  is  almost 
certainly doomed to failure. Generally, an entrant can only hope to succeed if he employs either a new 
technology or offers a new product, or both. Thus, the framework needs to be enlarged by putting it 
into a dynamic setting with heterogeneous agents
25. 
  Three groups of models can be distinguished in this period: a) learning by doing models, such 
as Jovanovic´s (1982), Frank´s (1988) and Ericson and Pakes´ (1989), b) evolutionary models which 
suppose an imperfect knowledge of the environment, namely Nelson and Winter (1982) and Audretsch 
(1995a  and  1995b)  and  c)  theories  of  industry  life  cycle  (Klepper  and  Graddy,  1990;  Gort  and 
Klepper, 1982). 
  Among the learning by doing models, is the one proposed by Jovanovic (1982). He develops 
a model that gives rise to entry, growth and exit behavior that agrees with the empirical evidence -that 
smaller  firms  grow  faster  and are  more  likely  to  fail  than large  ones-. The  model  deals  with  an 
industry which product is homogeneous and which costs are random. The potential entrant is assumed 
to know the mean and standard deviation of all firms´ costs but not its own mean expectation. Upon 
paying an entry fee, it starts to receive noisy information on its true cost level, which in every period 
might induce it to expand, contract or even exit. Efficient firms grow and survive, while the inefficient 
decline and fail. As firms learn about their efficiency as they operate in the industry, this model is 
known as “passive learning model”. 
  Similarly, Frank (1988) shows, in his basic model, a risk-neutral entrepreneur who takes all 
prices as given, but is unsure of his or her own talent for running a firm. He will enter only if expected 
profits  at  least  match  the  opportunity  costs.  Each  period  that the  firm  survives,  it  acquires  more 
information concerning true productivity. Using this new information, the entrepreneur revises his 
beliefs  concerning  expected  future  profits.  If  the  new  information  implies  very  poor  future 
productivity, then the entrepreneur will choose to leave the industry. There are three main differences 
between Frank´s and Jovanovic´s models: i) in the former the concern is more with the individual 
firm, while in the latter the concern is more with the aggregate industry; ii) in Frank´s model, the scale 
of operation affect the rate of entrepreneurial learning, so that new firms enter at scales of operation 
different  from  one another.  More  optimistic entrepreneurs  will enter  on  a  larger  scale; iii)  Frank 
supposes firms are fully rational Bayesian optimizers.  
  Pakes and Ericson (1989) also consider a similar model, that allows for heterogeneity among 
                                                 
25 In the traditional theory, outputs and inputs in an industry are assumed to be homogeneous. That is, the entry of 
new firms is about business as usual (Audretsch, 1995a). - 20 - 
firms, firm-specific sources of uncertainty, and discrete outcomes (exit and/or entry). It assumes that 
the firm knows the current value of the parameter that determines the distribution of its profits, and 
that the value of that profitability parameter changes over time in response to stochastic firm's own 
investments. Firms act so as to maximize the expected discounted value of future net cash flow and 
can invest to improve the value of the parameter which determines the distribution of its profits, for 
example, exploring and developing alternative market niches which may, or may not, prove profitable. 
That is why this model is known as “active exploration” or “active learning”.  In this model the 
distribution of futures states is determined entirely by the current state and the optimal investment 
policy. It is, therefore, independent of the age of the firm per se. 
  Various empirical papers have attempted to identify passive and active learning processes. For 
example, Pakes and Ericson (1998) claim that US manufacturing firms are more consistent with the 
active learning model whilst retailing firms are more consistent with the passive learning model. 
  Among  the  first  evolutionary  models  which  suppose  an  imperfect  knowledge  of  the 
environment  is  Nelson and Winter´s  (1982). Their theory  emphasizes the  tendency  for  the most 
profitable firms to drive the less profitable ones out of the business. However, they do not focus the 
analysis on hypothetical states of industry equilibrium, in which all the unprofitable firms no longer 
are in the industry and the profitable ones are at their desired size. Their modeling approach does not 
use the maximization calculus to derive equations characterizing the behavior of firms. Instead, they 
model firms as simply having, at any given time, certain capabilities and decision rules. Over time 
these capabilities and rules are modified as a result of deliberate problem-solving efforts and random 
events. And over time, the economic analogue to natural selection operates as the market determines 
which firms are profitable and which are not, and tends to winnow out the latter. 
  Audretsch (1995a and 1995b) examines why new firm star up activity varies so greatly across 
industries and focus on the underlying technological regimes. Instead of asking “Why do firms enter 
an industry?” he wonders “Why do economic agents start new firms?”. And he argues that they do so 
in order to best appropriate the expected value of new economic knowledge. Asymmetries in new 
economic knowledge (business ideas) combined with high costs of transacting lead to divergences in 
beliefs about potential innovations as follows: since new economic knowledge is not only imperfect 
but also asymmetric, agents must decide whether to pursue their anticipated innovation within the 
boundaries of an incumbent enterprise or start a new one. If the expected value of new economic 
knowledge diverges greatly enough across economic agents, they will have a greater incentive to start 
new  firms. And  because  the  degree  of  asymmetries  and  transaction  costs  vary  from  industry  to 
industry, the propensity for people to start firms should correspondingly also vary across industries. 
Focusing on the individual possessing uncertain knowledge leads to an additional economic role of the 
new  entrant  -not  just  to  equilibrate  the  market  by  increasing  the  supply  of  the  product  already - 21 - 
produced by the incumbent firms- but rather by doing something different and thereby serving as an 
agent of change.  
  He also states that the propensity for new firms to be started will be shaped by the underlying 
technological regime, that is the knowledge conditions subjacent the industry (Nelson and Winter, 
1974 and 1982). In some industries, new economic knowledge generating innovative activity tends to 
be relatively routine and can be processed within the context of incumbent firms. This corresponds to 
the  “routinized  regime”,  that  is,  one  favorable  to  innovative  activity  by  established  firms  and 
unfavorable to innovative entry (Winter, 1984). In other industries, innovations tend to come from 
knowledge  that  is  not  of  a  routine  nature  and  therefore  tends  to  be  rejected  by  the  hierarchical 
bureaucracies of incumbent firms. This corresponds to the “entrepreneurial regime”
26. He concludes 
and empirically demonstrates that start-up of new firms is more prevalent in industries characterized 
by a greater extent of information asymmetries, as measured by the entrepreneurial regime, where 
small firms have an innovative advantage over their larger counterparts
27. 
  More recently, Peneder (2008) proposes a new sectoral taxonomy and discriminates between 
entrepreneurial and routinized regimes by a sector’s relative exposure to competitive entry.  He argues 
that  potential  entrepreneurs  have  to  weigh  up  two  factors:  the  opportunity  and  the  cost  of 
experimentation. The first one is composed of the incentives to participate in the market, such as 
actual price-cost margins, potential for future growth, or the appropriability of novel ideas. The second 
determinant consist of the initial expenditures on starting the business as well as the cost incurred 
when the venture fails. As the former is proxied by net entry, the latter is proxied by the rate of firm 
turnover, since high turnover indicates relatively low barriers to entry and exit and thus low cost of 
experimentation.  Thus,  he  classifies  industries  according  to  both  factors  and  finds  five  types  of 
regimes exposed in Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1: AN INDUCTIVE TYPOLOGY OF ROUTINISED VERSUS ENTREPRENEURIAL MARKETS 
                                                 
26 Empirical evidence supporting the existence of these two distinct regimes includes: Acs and Audretsch (1987, 
1988 and 1990). 
27 An entrepreneurial regime is that one in which the ratio of the small firm innovation rate to the total innovation is 
particularly high. Conversely, a routinized regime is that one in which that ratio is particularly low. - 22 - 
Source: Peneder (2008) 
 
  Besides, theories of industry life cycle link entry and exit with the stage of the industry life 
cycle of the product. Klepper and Graddy (1990) and Gort and Klepper (1982)
28 find that the type of 
firm that entries and exits out of an industry, is closely linked to the stage of the industry life cycle. 
Figure 2 shows the average pattern of gross entry, gross exit and number of firms in a market across 
the various stages
29.  
  The rise in number of firms in stage 2 is propelled by the high gross entry, which begins to 
decline at the end of stage 2A and reaches its trough in stage 4. Gross exit rises continuously until it 
reaches a peak in the middle of stage 4 and declines thereafter. The decline in number of firms in the 
market in stage 4 is, therefore, driven mainly by rising exit. Time series reveal, in general, a negative 
relationship between gross entry and exit except in stage 2A, where the positive association results 
mainly from the rising number of incumbent firms available for exit (Agarwal and Gort, 1996). 
 
 FIGURE 2: ENTRY, EXIT AND NUMBER OF FIRMS ACROSS STAGES  
                                                 
28 Agarwal and Gort (1996) and Klepper (1996) also deepen into the relationship between firm demography and the 
theories of industry life cycle. 
29 Agarwal and Gort (1996) identify five phases based on gross entry: 1) initial low entry, 2) increasing entry, 3) 
decreasing though still generally high entry, 4) low entry, 5) erratic pattern.  - 23 - 
 
Note: N = number of firms, En = gross entry, Ex = gross exit.  
Source: Agarwal and Gort (1996) 
 
  Karlsson and Nyström (2003) examine the exit and entry of firms within this framework with 
special reference to innovation and knowledge-intensity. They analyze whether knowledge-intensity 
differs for Swedish manufacturing firms that exit and enter in different stages of the product life cycle. 
The  empirical  results  show  that  entrants  in  the  early  stages  of  the  product  life  cycle  are  more 
knowledge-intensive than incumbent firms. It is also found that firms exiting in early stages of the 
product life cycle are more knowledge-intensive than firms exiting in later stages. This is because 
early stages of the product life cycle imply a high degree of uncertainty and require a high level of 
knowledge-intensity. Since uncertainty decrease over the product life cycle, less knowledge is needed 
in production during later stages of the product life cycle.   
  In sum, the new variables considered by these models are: i) the technological regime, ii) firm 
size and age
30, iii) investment strategy, iv) industry life cycle, v) other individual variables, such as 
dummy variables for regional or international industries and foreign ownership, vi) regional or urban 
factors, which will be described in detail in Section 1.7. 
 
Stylized facts 
 
  Geroski (1995) summarizes the empirical results about entry until that time and finds some 
stylized factors, which are updated by Bartelsman et al. (2004). We expose in this Section those ones 
referred to entry and exit, whereas Section 1.5 contains those ones related to survival. 
•  Entry is common. Large number of firms enter most markets in most years, but entry rates are 
far higher than market penetration rates. This difference arrives from the fact that entrants are 
much smaller than incumbents. In other words, small-scale entry is relatively easy, but large-
                                                 
30  Acs and Audretsch (1989a) find that small-firm entry varies considerably from the pattern of large-firm entry.  
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scale entry not. 
•  Although there is a very large cross-section variation in entry, differences in entry between 
industries do not persist for very long. In fact, most of the total variation in entry across 
industries  and  over  time  is  “within”  industry  variation  rather  than  “between”  industry 
variation.  Rather,  entry  seems  to  come  in  bursts  that  are  not  highly  synchronized  across 
industries. This observation is interesting because most other structural measures of industry 
competitiveness, which might be used instead of entry rates to describe the intensity of rivalry 
in markets, display very little “within” industry variation: the level of market concentration 
differs across industries but these differences are extremely persistent over time, and entry 
barriers are stable and structural features of particular industries which do not vary over time.   
•  Entry and exit rates are highly positively correlated, and net entry and penetration rates are 
modest fractions of gross entry and penetration rates. Entry and exit seem to be part of a 
process of change in which large numbers of new firms displace large numbers of older firms 
without  changing  the  total  number  of  firms  in  operation  very  much.  This  is  difficult  to 
reconcile with the traditional view that entry occurs when super-normal profits are positive 
and exit when they are negative. Audretsch (1995a) shows that entry and exit rates tend to be 
surprisingly high within a relatively short period of time. Agarwal and Gort (1996) observe 
that  the  positive  entry/exit  correlations  make  more  sense  in  industries  in  steady  state  of 
maturity, while in early and late phases of a product´s life cycle these correlations indeed 
reverse to negative.  
•  De novo entry is more common but less successful than entry by diversification. Entry firms 
for diversifying firms creating new plans enter at a larger scale than the average incumbent, 
grow faster and are less likely to fail than de novo firms. However, there is some evidence to 
suggest that diversified firms may close particular plants more readily than specialized firms.  
•  Entry rates  vary over time, coming in waves which often peak early in the life of many 
markets. Different waves tend to contain different types of entrants. Entry has a major effect 
on markets only at certain times in the product life cycle (Gort and Klepper, 1982). That is, 
entry rates tend to be higher for more recent industries but tend to decline as the industry 
matures (Klepper and Graddy, 1990; Klepper and Simons, 1993). 
•  There is a high pace of the reallocation of outputs and inputs across businesses that (i) is 
largely  within  narrowly  defined  sectors;  (ii)  differs  substantially  across  sectors  and  firm 
characteristics (for example, much more churning amongst young and small businesses. (see 
Ahn, 2000 and Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999 for surveys of the literature). 
•  The pattern of reallocation that results from entries and exits is far from random. In developed 
market economies, the evidence is that the pattern of reallocation is productivity enhancing, - 25 - 
that is, outputs and inputs go from less productive to more productive businesses (Olley and 
Pakes, 1996; Griliches and Regev, 1995; Foster et al., 2001, 2002). 
 
Motives to start a firm 
 
  Shapero (1983) distinguishes four main motives which can stimulate an individual to start a 
firm, from an entrepreneurial perspective: a) displacement factor, b) disposition to act, c) credibility, 
d) availability of resources. Except for the second one, more related to personal motivation, the three 
remaining ones may vary among regions and can explain regional differences in firm creation. The 
first one usually explains the exactly timing of the business formation and it may include negative 
factors -which are mainly push factors
31: migration, unemployment, dissatisfaction with the present 
job, discrimination-, as well as pull factors -such as new market opportunities, completion of a study, 
etc.-. The second one refers to the appropriate personality to become an entrepreneur, and includes 
attributes  such  as  need  for  achievement,  locus  of  control,  risk  taking  propensity,  tolerance  for 
ambiguity  or  family  background.  Credibility  refers  to  the  social  position  and  esteem  enjoyed  by 
businessmen in a particular society and recognizes that in some “social climates” entrepreneurship 
flourishes more than in others. Political opinions and attitudes can also play a role. The last main 
motive can be regarded as the more material stimulus, which can help a potential new firm to start 
activities by reducing risks and costs either nationally or in particular regions. For example, special 
financial and tax incentives, management and marketing counseling or subsidized housing costs. From 
the policy perspective, this last motive is of particular interest because of the possibility of public 
intervention. However, Keeble and Wever (1986) argue that  the credibility factor appears to have a 
much more significant influence in explaining regional variations in the number of new firms
32.  
  From an industrial organization perspective, we may also distinguish between entry based on 
pull and push factors. The former include inadequate performance of incumbents, expected increasing 
in future entry barriers, business opportunities, possession of specific technologies and expected weak 
reaction  by  incumbents. The latter  include inadequate  performance  in  firm´s  current markets and 
strategies, such as the need to protect the position of the company on narrowly linked markets. 
 
1.4. Firm exit: literature review and empirical evidence 
 
                                                 
31 These factors are known as “push” since the individuals are being pushed out of their current employment. “Pull” 
entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are those who are lured by their new venture idea and its personal implications. 
They are being pulled out of their current position by the challenge and the potential rewards -monetary and 
others- related to a new successful venture (Amit and Muller, 1995). 
32 Keeble and Wever (1986) suggest that in traditional new firm studies focused on the urban incubator hypothesis, 
too much attention has been paid to material and too little attention to social stimuli.  - 26 - 
  The exiting process and the reasons behind it shed considerable light on the process of firm 
selection, market evolution and adaptation of industry to change. Likewise, it generates significant 
social, territorial and personal costs. However, in spite of its relevance, there are relatively less studies 
referred to firm exit than firm entry. The greatest impediment to measuring the shares of exiting 
establishments is the lack of longitudinal data bases that identify the actual closure date of businesses. 
In addition, studies about firm exit may be less consistent, because of the time that passes by between 
the exit decision and the actual exit -because of the intention of recovering sunk costs-. To that effect, 
Caves and Porter (1976) suggest that exit is a less predictable phenomenon than entry.  
  Researchers have also explored details of exits, particularly in Europe and the United States. 
Harhoff et al. (1998) examine the probability of exit in German firms, distinguishing insolvency and 
voluntary liquidation. Taylor (1999) studies self-employment duration in the UK and distinguishes 
between involuntary and voluntary termination. Headd (2003) and Bates (2005) stress the existence of 
successful  closures  as  well  as  unsuccessful  closures.  Honjo  (1999b)  studies  survival  of  Japanese 
software firms and defines “failure” as exit by bankruptcy and “nonfailure” as other cases of exit. 
  The main determinants of exit mentioned in the literature are: i) level of profits, ii) industry 
growth, iii) age and size, iv) barriers to exit
33, v) technological regime, vi) stage of the industry life 
cycle -explained in Section 1.2-, vii) degree of industry concentration, viii) type of establishment 
already inhabiting the market, ix) gross entry, x) non-economic factors and xi) regional factors, which 
are explained in detail in Section 1.7. 
  In regard to the first variable, numerous investigations presume that each firm behaves with 
the objective of profit maximization, and exits from the market occur when the profit (or the ratio 
expected/realized profit) falls below some threshold (Jovanovic, 1982; Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1985; 
Frank, 1988; Klepper, 1996; Das and Das, 1996). Although we cannot predict whether a particular loss 
firm will exit without knowledge of the specifics of its situation, we would expect differences in exit 
rates among large groups of firms to be related to their differences in the proportion of loss firms. In 
empirical studies, firm exits are supposed to be linked with economic variables represented by profit 
measures,  such  as  the  price-cost  margin,  or  the  rate  of  growth  or  contraction  of  the  market
34 
(Mansfield,  1962;  Shapiro  and  Khemani,  1987; Austin  and  Rosenbaum,  1990).  In  particular,  the 
higher rate of industry growth, the higher is demand relative to industry capacity and the lower will 
be the number of exits, since more firms are expected to cover their costs and realize profits. However, 
despite industry growth may depress the propensity to exit for business of all ages, new and smaller 
                                                 
33 Baldwin and Gorecki (1991) study both type of barriers in the Canadian manufacturing sector, Kleijwed and 
Lever  (1996)  and  Dunne  et  al.  (1998)  analyze  mobility  barriers  in  German  and  American  manufactures 
respectively and Doi (1999) determines the impact of exit barriers in Japan. 
34 Although the  negative relationship between profit and output seems clear, there is empirical evidence to the 
contrary and even no relationship between the two phenomena. This owes to the intention of recovering sunk 
costs (Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1985; Siegfried and Evans, 1994; Cabral, 1995). - 27 - 
firms tend to be more adversely affected by low growth, because given their very low start up size, 
there is not a long way to go down. Symmetrically, smaller and younger firms are more positively 
affected by high growth
35 (Audretsch, 1995a). This author also finds an asymmetric effect: a higher 
rate of growth tends to shift the type of establishment exiting away from new entrants and towards 
incumbent businesses.  
  Most empirical studies include size and age as determinants of the exit process. Propensity to 
exit decreases both with age and size, since larger and older establishments have got more resources 
and ability of learning that enables them to stay in the market. Jovanovic´s (1982) model of “passive 
learning” and Frank´s (1988) model provide theoretical evidence about the relevance of size and age 
in the process of exit. Besides, both variables are highly correlated, so that new establishments tend to 
be substantially smaller than their mature counterparts. This generates disadvantages imposed by scale 
economies and higher costs. For example, Marcus (1967) points out that prices of some factors faced 
by small firms are higher; in particular, the cost of capital. Assuming that firms sell at the same price, 
this implies a lower profit rate and a higher probability of incurring losses given identical market 
risks.  
  Exits may also depend on the strength of exit barriers, which delay the exit from the market. 
The main exit barriers are scale economies and sunk costs, such as advertising, R+D investments or 
capital intensity. It is necessary to emphasize that barriers to entry may also constitute barriers to exit. 
Besides,  since  barriers  to  entry  and  exit  vary  considerably  across  industries,  the  process  of  firm 
selection is not constant across them. On the one hand, scale economies affect specially small and 
young firms. They are more vulnerable to the cost disadvantages imposed by high scale economies, 
and thus may be more likely to exit the market. Despite these firms are not deterred from entering 
industries with substantial scale economies, when they enter they must grow rapidly to become viable 
(Audretsch, 1995a). Besides, the negative consequences of small scale production in an industry with 
extensive scale economies are certainly greater than in an industry where only negligible economies of 
scale exist. Nonetheless, Audretsch (1995a) argues that suboptimal scale plants may compensate for 
their size disadvantage through a strategy of compensating factor differentials, for example, deviating 
from  the  manner  in  which  productive  factors  are  deployed  and  remunerated  by  their  larger 
counterparts. On the other hand, despite economic theory predicts a firm will leave the industry if it is 
incurring losses -if it is earning less than their opportunity rate of return-, it does not mean that all loss 
firms exit, or that those which leave do so instantaneously. Marcus
36 (1967) shows that, if a firm 
decides to leave, the length of departure period is determined by the ratio of variable to sunk costs. 
                                                 
35 This is consistent with the findings of Mills and Schumann (1985) that small firms account for greater share of 
economic activity during economic expansions and a reduced share during contractions (In: Audretsch, 1995a).  
36 The full model is: Exit =α0 + α1 PLFit + α2 K/Oit + α3rit+1 , + u where Exit, PLFit and K/Oit refer, respectively, to the 
i industry exit rate, proportion of loss firms, the capital-output ratio all in period t, and where rit+1 is the realized 
rate of return in the t + 1 period.  - 28 - 
Sunk costs may be quite small, such as licensing and incorporation fees, or very large such as capital 
assets, advertising or research costs. The lower the ratio of variable to sunk costs, the greater, ceteris 
paribus, is the likelihood that part of sunk costs is being recovered and the less likely is the firm to 
shut down immediately. Therefore, for a given proportion of loss firms, exit rates are negatively 
related to the ratio of sunk to variable costs. These results are consistent with Caves and Porter (1976), 
Mac Donald's (1986) and Frank (1988), whose model predict that the larger the sunk costs, the longer 
a series of bad results that will be required to induce exit.   
  As new firm survival varies considerably across industries and it is strongly influenced by the 
technological conditions (Audretsch, 1995a), the propensity for new entrants to exit was found to 
depend on a number of industry-specific characteristics, most notably the technological regime. In 
regard to the technological regime, Audretsch (1995a) suggests that chances of a new firm to exit are 
higher in industries characterized by the entrepreneurial regime.  
  Harrigan (1980) models the process of exit as an strategic game between competitors, and 
finds that the incentive to encourage incumbent rivals to exit rises along with industry concentration. 
In  this  regard,  Audretsch  (1995a)  finds  that  incumbents  account  for  a  greater  share  of  exiting 
establishments in highly concentrated markets, consistently also with Cosutta and Grillo (1986) and 
Baden-Fuller (1989).  
  The type of establishment already inhabiting the market and the gross entry rate are also 
important. Audretsch (1995a) includes small firm share to account for the first effect and to control for 
the existing establishment size distribution. The extent to which exiting establishments are accounted 
for  by  new  entrants  may  be  influenced  by  the  degree  to  which  new  businesses  are  entering  the 
industry. However, Audretsch (1995a) finds a negative effect in both cases. Love (1996a), on the other 
hand, notices that entry is the dominant determinant of exit.  
  There are other factors, such as the natural abilities of the owner, that are also important in 
explaining the probability of exit. However, these variables can be regarded as randomly distributed 
among different industries, specially in a conditional analysis. So, the estimators remain unbiased. 
  Finally,  Harada  (2007)  shows  that  small  firm  exits  occur  not  just  because  of  economic 
difficulties in their business but also for non-economic reasons, which account for more than 60% of 
the exits studied in Japan. These reasons include aging, illness or injury of the manager or relatives 
and diminished motivation for the business. Likewise, the probability of non-economic-forced exit is 
significantly higher if the manager is relatively old and/or female, the firm has not loans from a 
financial institution or if its sales are not decreasing. 
   
1.5. The relationship between entry and exit: Independence, symmetry or simultaneity? 
 
  Despite  firm  entry  and  exit  result  from  decisions  taken  by  different  units  and  depend  on - 29 - 
different factors, they are not isolated phenomena. In fact, the correlation between the regional rates of 
entry and exit is usually strong (Keeble and Walker, 1994; Reynolds et al., 1994), specially within 
manufacturing sectors (Dunne and Roberts, 1991). These facts suggest that the entries and exits of the 
markets are not independent processes but somehow interrelated.  
  First, studies which focus on one side of market implicitly assume that the independence 
hypothesis holds, that is, that there is no link between entry and exit. They have either analyzed the 
factors determining the entry of new firms (Orr, 1974; Geroski, 1991a; Baldwin, 1995) or the exit of 
incumbents (Marcus, 1967; Mata and Audretsch, 1995; Doi, 1999).  As it is previously exposed, entry 
and  exit  are  function  of,  respectively,  barriers  to  entry  and  exit.  Besides,  international  empirical 
evidence suggests that there are (dis)economies at the regional level that directly affect the decisions 
to  enter  and  exit.  Keeble  and  Walker  (1994)  and  Reynolds  et  al.,  (1994)  show  that,  even  after 
controlling for differences in the industrial mix, there are substantial differences in the regional rates 
of entry and exit. Thus, the specification of the typical reduced-form model is given by the following 
expressions, which should be estimated separately: 
 
LNGRE = f(BARENT, REGIO, CYCLE)               [3] 
LNGRX = f(BAREXI, REGIO, CYCLE)              [4] 
 
where  f  is  a  mathematical  function  that  links  entry  and  exit  to  their  determinants;  LNGRE  and 
LNGRX are, respectively, the natural logarithms of the gross rate of entry and exit; BARENT and 
BAREXI are vectors of variables that take into account the presence of, respectively, barriers to entry 
and barriers to exit
37, REGIO is a vector of variables made up of regional characteristics relevant to 
the decisions to enter or exit and CYCLE is a  vector of control variables to allow for the effects of the 
business cycle (Arauzo et al., 2007). Nevertheless, this hypothesis is very restrictive and may be 
affected by several specification errors (Manjón, 2002). 
  Second, the symmetry hypothesis states that barriers to entry are also barriers to exit, that is, 
the determinants of the rate of entry and the rate of exit are identical, or are highly correlated. For 
example, the specific investments that act as entry barriers may become exit barriers, once the new 
company has entered the market and the investment becomes a disincentive to leave it. Shapiro and 
Khemani (1987) firstly empirically examine this hypothesis, in which specification equations for entry 
and exit should be the same: 
                                                 
37 Arauzo  et  al.  (2007)  consider  for  BARENT  the  technological  intensity;  product  differentiation;  capital 
requirements;  market  power  of  the  incumbents;  profit  margins;  benefits  ex-post  and  a  proxy  for  market 
turbulence. Among the barriers to exit, they include: benefits ex-ante and several variables that may indicate the 
magnitude of the sunk costs: technological intensity, product differentiation, initial investment and size of the 
concerns. This is indeed what is mostly found in the literature (Siegfried and Evans, 1994; Carree and Thurik, 
1996). - 30 - 
 
LNGRE = f(BARENT, BAREXI, REGIO, CYCLE)          [5] 
LNGRX = f(BAREXI, BARENT, REGIO, CYCLE)          [6] 
 
  Third, the simultaneity hypothesis states that the entry of new companies encourages the 
closure of active companies, and viceversa, that is, that rates of entry and exit in a given sector or 
region can be considered to be simultaneously determined
38. Thus, entrances influence exits because 
they increase the pressure of competition in the market and displace the least efficient companies. This 
is the displacement effect. On the other hand, the companies that decide to abandon the market leave 
behind  niches  of  unsatisfied  consumers  that  encourage  new  companies  to  enter.  This  is  the 
replacement effect. In the general formulation, the endogenous variables appear as covariates: 
 
LNGRE = f(BARENT, BAREXI, REGIO, CYCLE, LNGRX)         [7] 
LNGRX = f(BAREXI, BARENT, REGIO, CYCLE, LNGRE)        [8] 
 
  Within the simultaneity hypothesis, Audretsch (1995a) argues that the evolutionary process of 
entry and exit may be characterized by three alternative metaphors. The relevant question is not which 
one is correct but under which circumstances is each metaphor more applicable:  
1.  The forest metaphor, that is, the displacement of incumbent enterprises by new firms. It dates 
back at least to Marshall (1920). He describes that, in the evolutionary market process, one 
can observe “...the young trees of the forest as the struggle upwards through the benumbing 
shade of the older rivals”. Schumpeter (1911) describes a process of creative destruction, 
where  new  firms  with  entrepreneurial  spirit  displace  the  tired  old  incumbents,  leading  to 
higher economic growth. One may wonder why would established incumbents be unable to 
fend off new entrants, given their inherent advantage both in available resources and leverage. 
Audretsch  (1995a)  answers  that  it  is  because  of  information  asymmetries,  principal-agent 
problems and the difficulties involved in monitoring. 
2.  The  metaphor  of  the  revolving  door:  the  bulk  of  exiting  firms  is  accounted  for  by  new 
entrants. That is, the majority of new entrants will not survive past the very short run, so that 
there is considerable exit and very little permanent penetration. 
3.  The  metaphor  of  the  conical  revolving  door,  where  the  top  part  -representing  the  largest 
enterprises in the industry- revolves much more slowly than the lower part -representing the 
small firms in the industry-. This view is consistent with the findings that the likelihood of 
                                                 
38 We must therefore ask whether a displacement-replacement effect is actually involved or whether it is simply a 
continuous process of trial and error. - 31 - 
survival is positively related to firm size and age and that firm growth tends to be negatively 
related to firm size
39. The barriers to survival determine the speed of the door. And the greater 
the degree of technological change and the extent of scale economies in the industry, the faster 
this conical door will revolve. 
 
  The evidence about which hypothesis is correct is not conclusive. The initial studies aim to 
reject the independence hypothesis. With regard to this, Shapiro and Khemani (1987), using Canadian 
cross-section data, conclude that symmetry exists, since barriers to exit are barriers to entry as well. 
They even find some evidence of displacement. Caves and Porter (1976), Eaton and Lipsey (1980 and 
1981) and Evans and Siegfried (1992) for the United States also find evidence that supports symmetry 
hypothesis.  
  More recent studies test symmetry hypothesis versus simultaneity hypothesis. This is relevant 
because omission of simultaneity, if it exists, may lead to several specification errors. On the one 
hand, Austin and Rosembaum (1990) and Rosembaum and Lamort (1992) for the U.S. and Fotopoulos 
and  Spence  (1998)  for  Greece,  reject  simultaneity.  On  the  other  hand,  Segarra  et  al.  (2002), 
Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1991), Evans and Siegfried (1992) and Kleijweg and Lever (1996) 
for Spain, Belgium, U.S. and Netherlands respectively, support the existence of a displacement effect.  
  In regard to the three metaphors, a study of the British manufacturing industry made by Love 
(1996b) concludes that the interaction between entry and exit is mainly a product of a revolving door 
effect.  Likewise,  Manjón  (2004)  finds  evidence  of  the  existence  of  a  conical  revolving  door 
phenomenon. Audretsch (1995a) finds that the type of establishment exiting depends considerably on 
the technological and demand characteristics of the industry. The revolving door metaphor seems 
more appropriate in markets where scale economies play an important role and where innovative 
activity is dominated by larger enterprises. By contrast, the forest metaphor may be more applicable in 
industries where the underlying conditions closely conform to the entrepreneurial regime. 
  Finally, Arauzo et al. (2007) demonstrate that sectoral, regional and business cycle variables 
are important for analyzing industrial rotation and confirm the simultaneity hypothesis for Spanish 
manufacturing firms during the 1980s and early 1990s
40. 
 
1.6. Survival: literature review and empirical evidence 
 
  In industrial economics, firm survival has been analyzed, at first, within the framework of firm 
                                                 
39 Audretsch (1995a) mentions studies by Mansfield (1962), Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988 and 1989), Evans 
(1987a and 1987b), Phillips and Kirchhoff (1989), Audretsch (1991 and 1994), Audretsch and Mahmood (1993, 
1994 and 1995), Mahmood (1992), Hall (1987), Mata (1993) and Wagner (1992 and 1994). 
40  Nevertheless, estimates from the symmetry and simultaneity hypotheses tend to agree, are relatively stable and 
jointly statistically significant.  - 32 - 
growth, since only survivors are able to grow. Then, it is treated as a particular point within the 
literature on entry and exit to become, in the nineties, in an independent field of research (Fotopoulos 
and Louri, 2000a). Once again, the main obstacle is the lack of panel data that follow the evolution of 
firms since its birth (Audretsch, 1991).  
  The initial empirical studies explain firm survival according to a set of variables defined at 
the industry level. In this sense, Audretsch (1991) finds that industry concentration, capital intensity 
and economies of scale affect adversely the survival of new firms, thus supporting the idea that entry 
barriers  are  more  effective  as  barriers  to  survival.  Moreover,  industry  growth  reduces  costs 
disadvantages, enhancing survival prospects of firms that enter with a sub-optimal size. Entry barriers 
-that affect industry contestability- and technology conditions are also found to play a significant role 
in determining hazard (Fotopoulos and Louri, 2000a). 
  As concentrating the analysis entirely at the industry level is recognized as a limitation, firm-
specific variables are subsequently introduced: start-up size, age, firm growth, stage of industry life-
cycle,  capital  intensity,  technology  employed,  industry’s  innovation  rate,  financial  structure  and 
ownership status. As for the first variable, the larger the start-up size, the less is the distance to be 
covered  by  newcomers  in  approaching  an  industry’s  minimum efficient  size  and  hence  the  more 
competitiveness and the more chances to survival. A positive influence of start-up size on survival of 
new  firms  was  empirically  established  in  various  developed  countries  (U.S.,  Canada,  Portugal, 
Greece)
41. As for the age, empirical studies show that new firms usually have a relatively high risk of 
failure during the first years of their existence. The main reasons for such a liability of newness are the 
problems of setting up an organizational structure, attaining its first profits and getting the new unit to 
work efficiently enough to compete. Some authors assume that older firms also face a relatively high 
likelihood of closing down, which is called the liability of aging. The main reason could be the 
inflexibility of established organizations (liability of senescence); an erosion of technology, products, 
business concepts, and management strategies over time (liability of obsolescence); or, particularly in 
the case of owner-managed firms, problems in finding a successor (Fritsch et al., 2006).  
  Besides, Agarwal and Audretsch (1999) suggest that the size-survival relationship is shaped by 
the stage of industry life-cycle and the potential for smaller firms to occupy market niches in their 
effort to overcome size related disadvantages. Doms et al. (1995) demonstrate that capital intensive 
plants and plants employing advanced technology are less likely to fail. Besides, an industry’s overall 
innovation rate affects negatively firm survival but not in industries where small firms have innovative 
advantage (Audretsch, 1991; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995). Agarwal (1996; 1998) shows that new 
and small firms enjoy a higher probability of survival in more technical-product industries and in 
                                                 
41 Fotopoulos and Louri (2000a) mention that Audretsch and Mahmood (1993; 1994), Dunne and Hughes (1994), 
Baldwin  and  Rafiquzzaman  (1995),  Mata  et  al.  (1995)  and  Fotopoulos  and  Louri  (2000b)  provide  strong 
favourable evidence, while Wagner (1994) presents ambiguous results. - 33 - 
phases of higher technological activity in an industry’s life cycle. In regard to financial variables, 
Fotopoulos and Louri (2000b) find that a conservative borrowing, larger initial financial size, heavier 
fixed asset commitment, higher profitability and lower diversification reduce the probability of exit. 
Evidence on ownership status shows that the hazard confronting branches of multi-plant firms and 
subsidiary  firms  is  higher  than  that  of  single-plant  entrants  (Audretsch  and  Mahmood,  1995) 
suggesting that exit may be a strategic decision, taken more easily by diversifying firms. 
Macro-economic conditions may also facilitate or obstruct survival. In this sense, Audretsch 
and Mahmood (1995) show that the hazard rate for new firms is higher during downturns. They also 
observe a negative relationship between interest rate and the hazard confronted by U.S. companies. 
The explanation offered is that new firms in that country are not dependent on external capital. On the 
other hand, Boeri and Bellman (1995), suggest that exit in German manufacturing does not depend on 
the economic cycle. In Greece, Fotopoulos and Louri (2000b) find that firms established closer to 
economic downturns are more likely to fail, probably because they face adverse market conditions 
with  little  experience.  Finally,  just  a  few  studies  include  individual  characteristics  of  the 
entrepreneurs (van Praag, 2003) or firm strategies (Littunen, 2000). 
  Geroski (1995) mentions some stylized facts related to survival, which are updated, among 
others, by Bartelsman et al. (2004): 
•  The survival rate of most entrants is low, and even successful entrants may take more than a 
decade to achieve a size comparable to the average incumbent. That is, the likelihood of a firm 
exiting apparently declines with both age and size (Audretsch, 1995a), since experience may 
be crucial determinant of survival rates. Further, the process of firm selection does not seem to 
be constant across industries. There is evidence to suggest that survival rates vary more across 
industries than entry rates (Audretsch, 1991; Mata and Portugal, 1994; Wagner, 1994).  
•  Costs of adjustment penalize large-scale initial entry and very rapid post-entry penetration 
rates. In other words, despite the probability of survival tends to increase with firm -or plant- 
size; conditional on survival, the proportional rate of growth of a firm is decreasing in size 
(Evans 1987a, 1987b; Dunne et al., 1988, 1989). 
•  Klepper and Graddy (1990) and Gort and Klepper (1982) also find that the type of firm that 
exits out of an industry is closely linked to the stage of the industry life cycle.  
 
As for the methodology, the initial econometric method for analyzing the lifetimes of firms has 
been the econometric model proposed by Cox (1972; 1975). It allows the analysis of the duration of a 
sample of firms that belong to different cohorts or time origins. The aim is to explain the probability 
that a firm exits in t, conditional on that it has survived up to the time just before t. It can also be 
extended to include time-varying covariates along with time-invariant ones (Lancaster, 1990), which - 34 - 
allows to explain the probability of exit at t for firms that had not exited earlier and whose covariates 
had followed a certain path. Nowadays, there are several econometric specifications to account for 
survival, and the subject have progressively become more sophisticated, addressing issues such as 
discrete time, unobserved heterogeneity and competing risks (see Manjón and Arauzo, 2008, for a 
survey).  
 
1.7. Spatial issues on firm dynamics 
 
  Spatial factors have been more recently included as determinants of firm demography. They 
have been taken into account mainly in two ways: on the one hand, their influence in the entry of 
firms  -industrial  location-  and,  on  the  other  hand,  their  impact  on  firm  survival  -which  implies 
analyzing exit of firms as well-. The first group of contributions dates back to the ends of 19
th century 
(Marshall, 1890) and its relevance has been recently increased, due to the same reasons that lay behind 
the interest on firm demography. Nowadays, firm location is a subject of great interest. Businessmen 
want to know where to locate their plants, as well as state planners want to know the best way to 
attract new employment to their state. Besides, regional economists use business location to get an 
advance reading on the health of an economy: locational choices are a better barometer of a region's 
future than employment at existing plants, since newly locating plants respond to current incentives 
instead of prior locational decisions (Carlton, 1983).  
  However, despite urban and regional economies have been often employed to explain regional 
patterns of entry and exit, they have hardly been used to explain post entry performance. So, research 
about the effect of spatial factors on firm survival dates back just to the beginning of this century. The 
first academic studies to assess  for the impact of location and agglomeration economies on firm 
survival are Fotopoulos and Louri (2000a), Baldwin et al. (2000) and Honjo (2000a and 2000b). 
  This  section  is  organized  in  three  subsections:  the  first  one  is  devoted  to  the  initial 
contributions that explain why new industries emerge in particular places. We describe the seminal 
works  that  analyze  agglomeration  economies  and  diseconomies,  localization  and  urbanization 
economies, as well as internal and external economies of scale. In the next subsection we discuss 
recent  research  about  industry  location.  As  it  has  been  explained  through  three  theoretical 
perspectives, we describe three groups of determinants: neoclassical, institutional and behavioural. At 
last, in the third subsection, we expose the recent literature about the influence of spatial factors on 
firm survival. It is interesting to note that industrial location and post entry performance are closely 
related phenomena, since a firm will choose to locate in the region or the city that provides it higher 
profits.  Thus,  location  may  also  be  seen  as  an  indirect  approach  to  the  relationship  between 
agglomeration economies and efficiency. - 35 - 
 
1.7.1. Initial Contributions (1826-1970) 
 
  The analysis of the influence of spatial factors and the characteristics of the territories in 
location of economic activity begins in the 19
th century. Von Thünen (1826) designs a model that 
explains the location of crops in a homogeneous space around a market, which is represented by the 
city. He supposes different yields per hectare and transport costs. He concludes that, if farmers and 
landowners were allowed to compete among them for the use of the land, a gradient of leases would 
be established, and it would decline as it moves away from the areas near to the population. Every 
farmer chooses between paying more for the land or in terms of transport costs. The result corresponds 
to a model of concentric rings of production. 
  Weber  (1909)  adapts  Von  Thünen's  analysis  to  study  the  determinant  factors  of  the  ideal 
location of an industry during times of development and growth. At first, he argues that the optimal 
location is given by the place in which the costs of transport are minimized, either to the market or to 
sources  of  raw  materials.  Only  located  production  factors  affect  location  decision  and  this  may 
coincide with the location of raw materials, with the market or be any intermediate point. Secondly, 
Weber also believes that the optimal location decision may be taken according to the proximity to 
labor market, instead of minimizing only the transport costs, provided that the additional transport 
costs are offset by the savings due to the concentration of labor. Finally, he introduces for the first time 
the concept of agglomeration economies as a factor that compensates for higher costs of transport 
and that justifies the establishment of a firm near others belonging to the same industry.  
  Marshall (1890) is the first author to distinguish between economies of scale internal and 
external to the firm. The former consist of a decrease on the average cost of the firm as it increases its 
output, while the latter occur when the average cost is reduced by an increase in the volume of 
industry production, keeping constant that of each individual firm. External economies are classified 
into  three  categories:  those  that  come  from  a  specialized  labor  market,  those  resulting  from  the 
availability of suppliers and those related to the ease of transmission of information among agents 
located in the same geographic area. He also raises the concept of industrial district as a model of 
organization of production for some sectors in certain areas.  
  In addition, Hoover (1936 and 1937) classifies external economies into two types: localization 
economies and urbanization economies. The former are internal to the industrial sector to which the 
company belongs and occur when a firm obtains profits from locating close to other firms in the same 
industrial activity. Spatial concentration of a sector generates specialized production factors -which are 
shared  by  different  companies-,  the  development  of  a  suppliers'  market  of  raw  materials  and 
intermediate inputs -that implies both reduced transport costs and  efficiency and scale gains- and a - 36 - 
better organization of the labor market. On the other hand, urbanization economies are not related to 
a particular sector and, therefore, they are appropriable for all firms that share the same location, 
regardless of the industrial sector. They are defined as the concentration of economic activity and 
resources that benefit all firms located in the same area as they can operate more efficiently. These 
economies  include,  for  example,  the  existence  of  commercial  and  financial  services,  the  nearby 
presence of specialized suppliers of inputs and services, the access to public services, to infrastructure 
and to transport services, the existence of a business climate and a creative atmosphere, and the flows 
of ideas (knowledge spillovers) that allow the technological or organizational advances move more 
easily from one firm to another. To that effect, Jacobs (1969) supposes that the city is the environment 
in which knowledge transfer is more viable. Thus, she argues that the main factor that favors this 
transfer  is  the  diversity  of  productive  sectors. Therefore,  empirical  studies  relate  the  presence  of 
economies of urbanization to the dimension of the urban agglomerations, measured usually in terms of 
the  quantity  of  population,  the  number  of  people  employed  or  the  total  companies  in  each  area 
(Viladecans, 2004; Viladecans and Jofre, 2006). 
  Symmetrically, Townroe (1969) introduces the notion of urbanization diseconomies, which 
explain  why  economic  activity  is  not  concentrated  in  a  single  geographical  point. When  an  area 
overcomes the efficient dimension, problems associated with excessive concentration arise, such as 
congestion, higher prices of some inputs, social problems or pollution, and may limit the advantages 
of agglomeration.  
  Thus, there is a trade-off between agglomeration economies and agglomeration diseconomies, 
since the former generate benefits for the agents located in a certain region and provoke the attraction 
of more agents (centripetal forces), whereas the latter have an opposite effect and generate costs 
associated with the proximity, which restrict the location of new firms and even lead to the expulsion 
of the existing ones (centrifugal forces). 
  The  benefit  of  agglomeration  economies  is  not  neutral  to  the  age  of  the  firm.  Thus,  the 
incubator hypothesis states that new businesses are located in the central areas of large cities, where 
they can enjoy the environment they need in the initial stages of the life and, later, they move towards 
peripheral locations. Vernon and Hoover (1959) intensify the advantages that big cities offer to birth 
of firms as well as their survival in the first years of life. 
  Similarly, external economies are more important the smaller the size of the firm. This is 
because small firms generally have limited resources, and this leads them to depend more on the 
facilities  offered  by  the  environment  in  which  they  are  located.  This  dependence  decreases  with 
increasing firm size and its ability to provide for themselves services not provided by the environment. 
The localization patterns are neither uniform across sectors, as firms from different sectors also have 
different  needs.  Finally,  benefits  from  agglomeration  economies  may  depend  on  the  level  of - 37 - 
technological maturity of each sector. This is related to the theory of industry life cycle, since the 
needs of business environment depend on the stage of industry life cycle of the product. However, 
models and empirical studies that link agglomeration economies to stage of industry life cycle and 
firm location, are very recent (Duranton and Puga, 2001) and are explained in the next subsection. 
 
1.7.2. Recent Contributions on Industrial Location 
 
  Despite  the  location  of  production  units  has  been  a  major  topic  since  19
th  century,  since 
nineties there has been a boost in the number of empirical studies investigating the driving forces 
behind location decisions. The increasing number of public programs aiming to attract and promote 
the creation of new businesses, the advances in analytical foundations and econometric modeling, as 
well as a wider access to suitable data sets, are some of the reasons that explain the growing interest in 
the determinants of industrial location (McFadden, 2001; McCann and Sheppard, 2003; Guimarães et 
al., 2004).  
  There are basically two ways to explain which factors affect entry decision into an specific 
location:  i)  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  agent  that  makes  the  choice  or,  alternatively,  ii)  from  the 
viewpoint of the chosen territory. In the former case, factors related to the agent taking the decision -
size, sector, etc.- and those related to the set of alternatives -population, infrastructures, etc.- are 
considered  and  the  unit  of  analysis  is  the  establishment.  In  the  latter,  the  unit  of  analysis  is 
geographical -municipality, city, province, region, etc.- and the main objective is to analyze which 
characteristics  of  a  territory  affect  the  average  number  of  new  concerns  that  are  created  therein 
(Arauzo et al., 2010). There are also two alternative geographical units considered: the regional and 
the urban ones. The former refers to broader areas like provinces or regions where there are multiple 
relationships among firms, public institutions and individuals, while the later refers to smaller units 
(usually cities) where density of economic activity is considerably higher. 
  Arauzo et al. (2010) survey recent empirical literature about industrial location and find that 
the basic analytical framework has remained unaltered since the early contributions of the 1980´s, 
while, in contrast, there have advances in the quality of the data and in the econometric modeling
42. 
Thus, most recent contributions to this literature consist of new evidence on certain determinants -
taxes, wages, agglomeration economies, etc.- or new empirical and econometric approaches, often 
using new data sets, for example, data for smaller geographical areas, with longitudinal structure, etc. 
As  a  result,  these  investigations  differ  substantially  in  terms  of  econometric  specifications,  the 
definition  of  covariates  and  sampling  characteristics  -data  sources,  statistical  units,  institutional 
                                                 
42 Nowadays, Discrete Choice Models (Conditional Logit, Multinomial Logit and Nested Logit) and Count Data 
Models are the basic econometric tools used in empirical studies on industrial location. - 38 - 
settings, etc.- and these differences makes it hard to determine why some results vary across studies.  
  The theoretical perspectives used to explain entry decisions of new firms can be grouped into 
three main categories: neoclassical, institutional and behavioural (Hayter, 1997), although  there are 
factors that might be attributed to different theories. Neoclassical theories consider that rational and 
perfectly informed agents choose the optimal locations on the grounds of profit-maximizing or cost-
minimizing strategies. Thus, neoclassical determinants are profit- or cost-driving factors such as 
agglomeration economies, transport infrastructures, stage of industry life cycle of the product and 
human  capital.  As  for  the  institutional  theories,  they  extend  the  neoclassical  framework  by 
considering  that  agents  decide  locations  given  a  network  of  economic  relations  -with  clients, 
suppliers, competitors, unions, public administrations, etc.- that also affect profit and cost functions. 
Accordingly, institutional factors somehow measure how these relationships affect location decisions. 
They include, for example, actions taken by public administrations, in particular, taxes, environmental 
regulations and incentive programs for new business. Lastly, behavioural theories emphasize the role 
of individual preferences. Thus, while neoclassical and institutional theories stand on factors that are 
“external” to the firm, behavioural factors have an “internal” (size, age, etc.) and “entrepreneurial” 
(previous experience, residence, etc.) nature. 
 
Neoclassical determinants 
 
  Recent  research  related  to  agglomeration  economies  include  i)  a  dynamic  or  historical 
dimension of the economies of localization and urbanization, ii) the relationship with the theory of 
industry life cycle of the product and iii) the scope of the economies. In regard to the former, some 
studies  consider  that  the  history  of  a  geographic  area  -proxied  by  the  concentration  of  historical 
industrial sector or the size of an industry in the past- is relevant to explain the productivity or the 
current  location  of  the  production  units. Thus,  dynamic  externalities  deal  with  the  role  of  prior 
information accumulations in the local area on current productivity and hence employment. Such 
accumulations are fostered by a history of interactions and cultivated long-term relationships, which 
lead to a buildup of knowledge -“local trade secrets”-, available to firms just in a local area. 
  Thus, Glaeser et al. (1992) adapt the concepts of urbanization and localization economies to a 
dynamic context, and distinguish three types of dynamic externalities: MAR, Porter and Jacobs. MAR 
external  economies  come  from  the  contributions  of  Marshall  (1890), Arrow  (1962)  and  Romer
43 
(1986) and derive from a buildup of knowledge associated with ongoing communications among local 
firms in the same industry. Therefore, the savings would be equivalent to localization economies in a 
                                                 
43 The literature on endogenous growth models argues that dynamics information externalities are the driving force 
for technological innovation and hence economic growth (Romer, 1986). - 39 - 
dynamic context. Similarly, Porter (1990) economies consider that the accumulation of knowledge 
among  companies  specialized  in  the  same  activity  and  concentrated  geographically  stimulate  the 
economic growth. However, unlike the previous approach, Porter believes that perfect competition is 
the market structure in which this transfer is more successful. At last, Jacob economies owe to the 
studies of this authoress based on the assumption that the city is the way in which knowledge transfer 
is more viable. They state that a buildup of knowledge or ideas associated with historical diversity 
favors this transfer. Thus, they are the dynamic equivalent of the urbanization economies. 
  Henderson  et  al.  (1995)  follow  this  typology,  but  they  do  not  take  into  account  Porter 
externalities. They observe that the influence of MAR and Jacobs externalities depends on the  level of 
technological maturity of each sector. Thus, for mature capital goods industries, they find evidence of 
MAR  externalities,  but  none  of  Jacobs  externalities.  That  is,  employment  growth  in  traditional 
manufacturing industries is higher in cities with high past employment concentrations in the own 
industry. On the other hand, for new high-tech industries, they observe evidence of Jacobs as well as 
MAR externalities, even though the former seem to be more important. That is, high-tech firms are 
more likely to take root in cities with a history of industrial diversity. They conclude that Jacobs 
externalities are important for a city´s ability to initially attract new industries, but for retaining these 
industries prior concentration of the own predecessor industry is what matters.  
  These findings are consistent with the theory of product cycles: new industries prosper in 
large, diverse metropolitan areas, with innovative environments plenty of qualified human capital. 
However, with maturity, production descentralizes to smaller, more specialized cities with lower costs. 
This happens because different costs of production -capital, R+D, management, unskilled labor, etc.- 
have different relative importance depending on the phase of the product life cycle. This means that 
the needs of business environment depend on the stage of industry life cycle of the product. Duranton 
and  Puga  (2001)  build  a  dynamic  general-equilibrium  model  and  derive  conditions  under  which 
diversified and specialized cities coexist. They find that new products are developed in diversified 
cities, trying processes borrowed from different activities. Once firms find their ideal process, they 
switch to mass production and relocate to specialized cities where production costs are lower. These 
authors find evidence of this pattern for France.  
  In particular, high-tech firms are more likely to be found around populated areas. Bade and 
Nerlinger (2000) find that German start-ups in technology intensive industries prefer to be located in 
large agglomerations. This also seems to be the case for small and medium size biotech firms and 
large R+D labs in France (Autant-Bernard, 2006; Autant-Bernard et al., 2006). Arauzo and Viladecans 
(2009)  also  show  that  Spanish  manufacturing  establishments  in  high-tech  industries  prefer  to  be 
located as close as possible to the centre of the metropolitan area.  
  Besides, Rosenthal and Strange (2004) analyze the scope of the economies of agglomeration. - 40 - 
They mention three types of scope of urban increasing returns -sectorial, territorial and temporal- and 
note that agglomeration economies weaken with the distance in all cases. Sectorial scope concerns the 
degree to which economies of agglomeration are spread to all industries or whether they are specific 
to a particular activity. Thus, it may be relevant to analyze the scope that increasing returns have 
inside a value chain, which includes shared suppliers or customers, that belong to different traditional 
industrial classifications. Territorial scope refers to the impact that the economic activity of an area 
has on the economic activity of a neighboring area, that is, to spatial autocorrelation. Ciccone and Hall 
(1996) give a first step to consider the geographical environment as a determinant of agglomeration 
economies, by taking into account the economic density of the neighboring states as a determinant of 
differentials  in  productivity.  Moreover,  Rosenthal  and  Strange  (2003),  have  identified  the  precise 
geographical scope, which varies depending on the productive sector and the type of economies of 
agglomeration. In regard to temporal scope, Glaeser et al. (1992) and Henderson et al. (1995) show 
that previous agglomeration economies may have impact on current productivity and employment.  
  Another cost-driving neoclassical factor is transport infrastructures. Since a substantial part 
of  business  activities  involves  moving  inputs  and  outputs,  better  accessibility  to  transport 
infrastructures has been hypothesized to have a positive impact on the location decisions of firms. 
This has been supported by a number of empirical studies in Belgium (Baudewyns et al., 2000), Spain 
(Holl, 2004b; Arauzo, 2005; Alañón et al. 2007), Poland (Cieślik, 2005), Portugal (Holl, 2004a) and 
the  U.S.  (Coughlin  et  al.,  1991;  Friedman  et  al.,  1992;  Smith  and  Florida,  1994;  Luker,  1998; 
Coughlin  and  Segev,  2000;  List,  2001).  However,  the  importance  of  this  effect  differs  across 
manufacturing  sectors,  which  indicates  that  accessibility  requirements  may  vary  with  technology 
and/or demand.  
  Among the human capital characteristics, wages and education have been the most actively 
explored. First, it has been largely demonstrated that firms tend to avoid areas with higher wages
44. 
Second,  most  studies  tend  to  conclude  that  geographical  areas  that  have  a  higher  mean  level  of 
education in the working population are more attractive (Coughlin et al., 1991; Woodward, 1992; 
Smith and Florida, 1994; Coughlin and Segev, 2000; see, in contrast, Bartik 1985 and Arauzo 2005). 
Universities may also play an important role, since knowledge-based start-ups may cluster around 
them, influenced by the knowledge output as well as the innovative capacity of the region (Audretsch 
and Lehmann, 2005). The impact of unemployment on location may not be a priori determined. On 
the one hand, it may stimulate individuals to start a firm and may imply a lower cost of labor, but, on 
the other hand, it may reflect a weaker demand and, hence, lower expected benefits -see, for example, 
Coughlin et al. (1991) and Cieślik (2005b) for evidence of positive effects of unemployment on 
                                                 
44 Arauzo et al. (2010) mention Luger and Shetty (1985); Coughlin et al. (1991); Papke (1991); Friedman et al. 
(1992); Henderson and Kuncoro (1996); Luker (1998); List (2001); Barbosa et al. (2004) and Basile (2004). 
Evidence on the contrary may be found in Smith and Florida (1994). - 41 - 
location and Woodward (1992), Storey (1991) and Reynolds et al. (1994) for negative effects-. Other 
factors related to human capital characteristics analyzed by the literature include: level of unionism 
(Coughlin et al., 1991; Friedman et al., 1992; Head et al., 1995), labour productivity (Schmenner et 
al.,  1987;  Friedman  et  al.,  1992;  Barbosa  et  al.,  2004),  poverty  (Woodward,  1992),  number  of 
scientific publications and academic research (Autant-Bernard et al., 2006) and relevant managerial 
skills (Love, 1996). 
  Finally, other neoclassical determinants used to explain industrial location are: energy price 
(Carlton, 1979 and 1983; Schmenner et al., 1987), land costs (Hansen, 1987; Papke, 1991; Cheng and 
Stough, 2006), foreign trade zones (Head et al., 1999), local demand (Henderson and Kuncoro, 1996), 
local income (Love, 1996) and agglomeration of foreign firms (Basile et al., 2003). In their survey, 
Arauzo et al. (2010) provide details about spatial unity, period, industry level, main determinants and 
econometric specification for each study. 
 
Institutional factors 
 
  Institutional factors include the actions taken by public administrations, in particular: i) taxes, 
ii) environmental regulations and iii) incentive programs. The effects of tax incentives
45 is ambiguous 
and findings “are so disparate that they offer little guidance to policy makers” Buss (2001) -see this 
author for an overview-. In the 1980s, studies about firm location decisions tend to support earlier tax 
literature, finding little or no impact of taxes on location. Over time, studies show that taxes seem to 
matter once firms have made decisions on labor, transportation, raw materials and capital costs. Some 
research in the nineties departs from the representative firm approach (Fisher and Peters, 1997) and 
allows for the possibility that some taxes impact relatively more on particular businesses, for example, 
taxes on machinery on capital-intensive industries. Besides, manufacturing location decisions seem 
more sensitive to taxes than nonmanufacturing location decisions (Fisher, 1997). As for FDI, several 
studies -Coughlin et al., 1991; Friedman et al., 1992; Woodward, 1992; Devereux and Griffith, 1998 
and Coughlin and Segev, 2000- report a negative effect of taxes on the location of foreign firms. More 
recently, Gabe and Bell (2004) argue that there is a trade-off between taxes and the provision of public 
goods and services. They show that high-tax locations are on average more attractive than low-tax 
locations with a poor provision of public goods and services. 
  The evidence is neither conclusive with regard to environmental regulations -see Jeppesen et 
al. (2002) for an overview-. On the one hand, initial studies (Bartik, 1988; Mc Connell and Schwab, 
1990, Levinson, 1996) conclude that the effects of environmental regulations on firm location are 
                                                 
45 Tax incentives usually refer to direct and indirect government subsidies to business that are not inherently part of a 
generally accepted tax structure, including but not limited to property tax abatements, tax exemptions, low interest 
loans, firm-specific infrastructure, and firm-specific job training (Coenen and Hellerstein, 1996, p. 793). - 42 - 
minimal or non-existent. Particularly, List (2001) reports similar results for the FDI in California. On 
the other hand, Becker and Henderson (2000) conclude that manufacturing plants have moved from 
areas where the air-quality standards have not been attained to areas where they have. Similarly, List 
and McHone (2000) find that manufacturers in pollution intensive sectors in the U.S. are deterred 
severely by more stringent county-level environmental regulations. Thus, these regulations generate 
the diversion of new pollution intensive plants to counties with less stringent regulations, which are 
also counties historically free of pollution. They recognize that more research needs to be done in 
order to evaluate the efficacy of those environmental policies. 
  Finally, there is no conclusive evidence about the effectiveness of public incentive programs 
to  attract  new  firms.  Lee  (2004)  shows  that  these  programs  have  had  little  effect  on  relocation 
decisions in the U.S., even though firms located in states that implement these programs seem to have 
been benefited in terms of growing employment, capital and output. Guimarães et al. (1998) reach 
similar conclusions with respect to the regional incentive policies of Puerto Rico in the early eighties. 
In contrast, FDI seems to be more sensitive to this kind of incentives, as it is to tax reduction, since 
support of public administration has been found to be a critical determinant (Friedman et al., 1992; 
Woodward, 1992).  
 
Behavioural factors 
 
  These factors have been comparatively less studied, mainly because of the difficulty to find 
appropriate  data  about  entrepreneurs  and  their  personal  circumstances.  Figueiredo  et  al.  (2002) 
compare location alternatives inside and outside the entrepreneur’s area of residence and argue that 
exists a preference for the home base, the so-called “home bias”, which may stem from personal 
factors, social capital, other non-transferable assets and imperfect information about the urban and 
regional environment. They find that some investors are willing to accept over three times higher 
labor costs to compete in their resident areas of business. In contrast, non-home location choices are 
governed by neoclassical factors, such as agglomeration economies and the proximity to major urban 
centres. Meester and Pellenbarg (2006) also find that actual location of a firm is the most important 
variable that determine the locational preference patterns; it is more important than sector, size of 
market area or company size. They also argue that the willingness of entrepreneurs to move to a 
certain region is not depending on the real qualities of a region but on their perception of those 
qualities. Besides, Arauzo and Manjón (2004) provide evidence that large and small firms follow 
different location patterns: whereas large firms seem to be mostly guided by objective (quantitative) 
factors, small firms seem to be mostly guided by the entrepreneur’s (qualitative) preferences.  
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1.7.3. A note about the ambiguous results found in the literature 
 
  As Arauzo et al. (2010) show in a recent survey, regional economics literature has produced a 
number of ambiguous results. Audretsch and Fritsch (1999) argue that this owes to the omission that 
the link between geographic specific factors and the propensity to start new firms varies from industry 
to  industry. They  point  out  that  most  studies  on new  firm  formation  in  different  regions  explain 
aggregated startups across all sectors, that is, the following model is estimated: 
 
Sj = α + β1j X1j +  β2j X2j + … + βkj Xkj               [9] 
 
where S represents the new-firm startup rate in region j, and each X represents a region specific 
variable. It is implicitly assumed that each parameter has the same impact on startup activity across 
each manufacturing industry. This approach ignores that each regional variable may impact differently 
in  the  startup  activity  across  industries.  For  example,  unemployment  may  affect  more  to  labour-
intensive activities and academic research may impact more on high tech startups. In order to control 
for the industry when linking the influence of geographic specific characteristics to new-firm startup 
activity, Audretsch and Fritsch (1999) modify equation [9] so that: 
 
Sij = αi + β1ij X1j +  β2ij X2j + … + βkij Xkj               [10] 
 
where S is the startup rate of new firms in industry i and in geographic region j and the parameters are 
allowed  to  vary  across  industries. Although  the  set  of  explanatory  variables  is  still  specific  to  a 
geographic region and not to any particular industry, each estimated parameter in the model becomes 
specific for each particular industry. 
  In addition, variations in the estimated parameters from equation [10] are not random but 
rather related to characteristics associated with specific industries. To determine whether the influence 
of a particular geographic specific variable on new-firm startup activity depends on the characteristics 
specific to the industry, these authors suggest estimating a second stage model: 
 
βk = φk + φ1k Z1k + φ2k Z2k + … + φmk Zmk               [11] 
 
where the dependent variable is the value of the estimated parameters from Equation [9], and the 
explanatory variables, Zm are m industry specific variables which determine the response in the startup 
rate of a specific industry to a change in a geographic specific variable. 
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1.7.4. Recent Contributions on Firm Survival 
 
Spatial issues have been recently included in firm survival research. The first papers that 
account for these factors as their main objective date back to the beginning of this decade (Fotopoulos 
and Louri, 2000a, for Greece, Baldwin et al. ,2000, for Canada, Honjo, 2000a and 2000b, for Japan)
46. 
They suppose that failure rates may be highly correlated with particular geographic areas or with firm 
location with respect to urban agglomerations. They account for regional/urban differences including 
dummies variables, which control for these effects on the hazard. 
As studies on location, there are two ways to explain the impact of spatial effects on firm 
survival: i) from the viewpoint of the firm, including a dummy variable in order to refer the location 
or ii) from the viewpoint of the characteristics of the territory. Different studies also assess for the 
impact of locating in a particular region, urban area, local market area or even compare between urban 
and rural zones. 
In their survey, Manjón and Arauzo (2008) argue that empirical evidence about the impact of 
spatial factors on survival is unclear. For instance, Fotopoulos and Louri (2000a) estimate the impact 
of the proximity to urban environments in survival and conclude that location in Greater Athens -
versus the rest of the country- affects survival positively, especially for smaller firms. However, this is 
opposed to Fritsch et al. (2006), who show that hazard rates for Germany are higher in large cities and 
that population density affects survival adversely. Strotmann (2007) points out, for the same country, 
that firms located in rural areas have more chances to survive than those located in urban areas. 
Littunen (2000) discusses the Finnish case and he finds that survival is lower in environments that, in 
principle, provide more opportunities for entrepreneurs. A more developed production structure may 
lower entry barriers to all firms, even those who lack the skills necessary to keep the project alive. 
This explains why the hazard rate may be greater in urban than in other regions. At last, Fertala (2008) 
shows a non-lineal relationship -inverted U shape- between hazard rates and agglomeration levels.  
However,  these  studies  differs  significantly  in  regard  to  the  type  of  firms  included,  the 
variables
47  analyzed,  the  econometric  approach,  the  reason  of  exit  and  the  characteristics  of  the 
                                                 
46 Previous studies explain the  differences in labor productivity across regions.  For instance, Ciccone and Hall 
(1996) estimate a model based on local geographical externalities and other one based on the diversity of local 
intermediate services. In both of them, spatial density results in aggregate increasing returns. They find a positive 
relation between county employment density and productivity at the state level in the U.S. 
47 Studies that account for the spatial dimension on firm survival (Shane and Foo, 1999; Fotopoulos and Louri, 
2000a; Honjo, 2000a and b; Fritsch et al., 2006; Strotmann, 2007; Fertala, 2008) include, among others, the 
following variables: a) at the firm level: employees (as a proxy of size), age, firm employment growth, return on 
assets, obligations and long-term asset (debt level), ratio of fixed assets over total assets (liquidity constraints); 
multi-plant  firm;  ln  from  capital  (financial  strength);  vertical  integration  b)  at  the  industry  level:  sunk  costs 
(contestability); sector; Herfindahl Index (concentration);  growth of the sector turnover rate (demand); initial 
number of plants (market size); number of entries (dynamic sector); gross entry rate (competition and Barriers to 
entry); industry price-cost margin; excess-job-turnover (heterogeneity); high-tech sector; c) at the macroeconomic 
level: cohort or calendar years (economic cycle); macroeconomic growth; d) at the individual level: characteristics - 45 - 
country. The latter variable is particularly relevant in the context of this thesis project. For instance, 
Germany  has  an  industrial  structure  which  is  very  different  from  the  Greek  one:  industry 
concentration is much lower and the infrastructure that links the metropolitan area with the rest of the 
country is better
48. Services characteristics and regional industrial policy may be different as well.  
  Even studies that are similar in terms of methodology and approach -for example, Fotopoulos 
and Louri, 2000a and Strotmann, 2007- but which are performed for countries with different levels of 
development, show opposite conclusions. Thus, economic, social and institutional differences between 
Germany and Greece might be important enough to modify the impact of locating near urban areas in 
the two countries.    
  Finally, the impact of regional variables may vary depending on the characteristics of the 
analyzed periods. For instance, Acs et al. (2007) empirically test the relationship between regional 
human capital stocks and new-firm survival among local market areas in the U.S. The find a positive 
relationship  between  the  two  variables  for  the  period  1993–1995,  which is  not  as  strong  for  the 
recession period 1990–1992. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
of the manager; e) at the spatial level: location (dummy variable); location * small size; urban or rural area; 
geographical  concentration  or  agglomeration;  number  of  entries  in  neighboring  regions;  population  density; 
regional growth; regional employment share; regional unemployment rate; and business climate and institutional 
legitimacy. 
48 The main contribution of these authors is that survival depends not only on regional and sectoral characteristics 
but also on the number of entries in neighboring regions. Thus, they provide evidence that spatial autocorrelation 
is an important issue to explain survival rates.  - 46 - 
PART 2: FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
  
2.1. Differences between developing and developed countries  
 
  Though firm dynamic processes respect certain regularities synthesized by Geroski (1995), 
they may acquire particular features depending on the degree of development of each country. First, 
Bartelsman  et  al.  (2004)  argue  that  in  developing  countries  market  structure  and  institutions  are 
usually more distorted. For instance, it might be that different policies act to subsidize incumbents, or 
give them a preferential treatment, some procedures artificially increase the barriers to entry -such as 
poorly functioning financial markets and/or regulatory barriers-, while other policies make exits for 
some types of businesses more frequent -such as  poorly functioning financial markets for young and 
small businesses-. However, the effects of these distortions are not clear. These authors hypothesize 
that countries -or sectors- where the creative destructive process is distorted in some manner will have 
less churning and lower productivity levels and productivity growth rates. That is, artificially high 
barriers to entry will lead to reduced firm turnover, increased incumbents survival probabilities, lower 
productivity
49 and less efficient allocation of resources.  
  But, in fact, developing countries generally exhibit higher rates of rotation. These authors find 
that total firm turnover is in between 3-8% in most industrial countries and more than 10% in some of 
the transition economies
50. There are also discrepancies between firm entry and exit across firm size 
among Latin American countries: while Mexico, Chile and Venezuela show vigorous firm turnover, 
Colombia  and  especially Argentina  show  less  turbulence,  closer  to  the  values  observed  in  some 
Continental European countries. They suggest also that institutional distortions might yield a larger 
gap in productivity between entering and exiting businesses. Given high barriers to entry, the average 
productivity of entrants will rise while the average productivity of incumbents and exiting businesses 
will fall. 
  Alternatively, some types of distortions in market structure and institutions might make the 
entry and exit process less rational, that is, less driven by market fundamentals but more by random 
factors.  Such  randomness  would  imply  less  systematic  differences  between  entering,  exiting  and 
incumbent firms -in the extreme when all entry and exit is random there should be no differences 
between entering, exiting and incumbent businesses-. 
  Another  related  problem  is  that  a  business  climate  that  encourages  more  market 
                                                 
49 Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) illustrate this prediction trough a calibration exercise, using an extreme example 
where all reallocation is shutdown. 
50 They calculate over firms with at least 20 employees to maximize the country coverage. Extending the tabulations 
to include also micro units increases total turnover to between one-fifth and one-fourth of all firms.  - 47 - 
experimentation might have a smaller short run contribution from the creative destruction process. 
That is, market experimentation may be associated with more risk and uncertainty in the short run, so 
that it is only after the trial and error process of the experimentation has worked its way out -through 
learning and selection effects- that the productivity payoff is realized. Thus, a business climate that 
encourages market experimentation might have a lower short run contribution from entry and exit, but 
a higher long run contribution. 
  Besides, macroeconomic instability and the intense cyclical variations that characterize many 
developing countries, might induce patterns of entry and exit different from the ones observed in 
developed countries. A research carried out by Castillo et al. (2006) for industry, commerce and 
services firms in Argentina, shows that the process of birth and shutdown of plants is pro cyclical: rate 
of entry increases during the years of economic growth and decreases in recessive years. Equally, the 
rate of exit diminishes during expansive years and increases in the recessions. Thus, firm population 
grows during economic growth periods. These results contrast with those found for Portugal and 
Germany, where few evidence exists in respect to the effects that macroeconomic conditions have on 
the  patterns  of  entry,  exit  and  survival  (Mata  et  al.,  1995;  Boeri  and  Bellman,  1995).  Besides, 
Caballero and Hammour (2000) point out that recurrent crises are an obstacle to creative destruction, 
specially because of the following tight financial-market conditions. 
  Another distinctive feature is that young companies usually have a relatively greater economic 
impact. In this respect, Argentinian firms younger than 10 years old concentrate twice the employment 
than their American counterparts. Symmetrically, mature firms in Argentina have a participation in the 
total employment (56%) substantially minor that the mature firms in the U.S. (79%) (Castillo et al., 
2006). That is because developed countries rely on a stabler managerial and consolidated structure, so 
that births, even in dynamic periods, represent a marginal portion of the employment (Davis et al., 
1997; Castillo et al., 2002). 
  Finally, unlike developed countries, Latin American firms mainly innovate through imitation 
or incorporation of knowledge developed by other organizations. For this reason, Burachik (2000) 
holds that innovative entry is a  very infrequent phenomenon in Latin American countries, where 
incumbents tend to enjoy advantages to incorporate technical progress, regardless relevant knowledge 
is external or internal to the firm. In most advanced countries, on the other hand, new and small firms 
enjoy  an  innovative  advantage  if  relevant  technological  knowledge  is  codified  and  external  to 
incumbent firms. In the same way, Amorós and Cristi (2008) argue that in Latin American countries 
most of the small-scale production firms have minor significance in innovation, and the products 
manufactured and the services provided are of discreet value added in comparison with the large and 
concentrated companies. Thus, these economies have a limited number of nascent ventures under the 
model of “entrepreneurial economy” because of the many restrictions present to create knowledge-- 48 - 
based businesses. 
2.2. Empirical research about firm demography in developing countries 
 
  Despite the distinctive features of developing countries, there is little evidence about firm 
demography  processes  in  them.  Fritsch  et  al.  (2006)  find  that  factors  that  have  a  statistically 
significant effect on survival en East Germany are fewer than those ones existing in West Germany. 
This means that survival of new businesses in East Germany is subject to erratic influences to a 
greater extent than is true in the West.   
  Bartelsman et al. (2004) analyze the process of creative destruction across 24 countries -ten 
industrial countries, five Central and Eastern European countries in transition, and nine emerging 
economies in Latin America and East Asia- over the nineties. They combine data from these countries 
and find large differences across groups of nations
51. In particular, Argentina resembles Continental 
Europe with smaller flows and less impressive post-entry growth of successful firms. Besides, they 
find  also  a  positive  cross-sectional  correlation  of  entry  and  exit  in  most  countries  -including 
Argentina-, which confirms previous evidence (Geroski, 1991a; Baldwin and Gorecki, 1991; see for 
Argentina  Castillo  et  al.,  2006)  and  suggests  that  entries  and  exits  are  largely  part  of  a  creative 
destruction process in which entry and exit reflects within sector reallocation
52. 
  They also present simple survivor functions across countries and sectors and they observe an 
important country effect. Argentina has one of the smallest rate of survival, behind Mexico, UK and 
near Colombia in manufacturing and only behind Mexico in the total business sector. About 20% of 
entering firms fail within the first two years, and only 40% of firms that remain in the business after 
the first two years survive for five more years. At the sectoral level, Argentinian rate of survival -in 4 
years- is lower than the average in every sector, except for Chemicals and Chemical Products. On the 
other hand, its survival rate is relatively lower in Office, Accounting and Computing Machinery and in 
Construction. Nevertheless, sectoral survival rate is in many cases more similar to industrial countries 
than to the other ones -as it is shown in Annex 1-. 
  They also perform a semi-parametric analysis of survival -Cox’ proportional hazard model- 
and conclude that controlling for industry composition and for right-censoring reduces the country 
differences in survivor rates. Thus, Argentina seems more similar to Colombia and Chile than to 
Mexico. Besides, they show that Argentina has one of the most convex functions, which means that 
                                                 
51 They show that, while entry and exit rates are fairly similar across industrial countries, post-entry performance 
differs markedly between Europe and the U.S., which they interpret as a potential indication of the importance of 
barriers to firm growth as opposed to barriers to entry. Transition economies show an even more impressive 
process of creative destruction, while Mexico shows large firm dynamics with many new firms entering but also 
many failing rapidly. 
52 Entry and exit are negatively correlated in some transition economies and in Colombia and Venezuela, which 
might reflect a greater role for sectoral profitability shocks in those countries (and/or might reflect measurement 
error). - 49 - 
exit rates are especially high for young businesses but decrease for older ones. 
  However, these authors mainly conduct an exploratory data analysis and they do not look for 
the determinants of the processes of firm demography. Besides, as their aim is comparing among 
different countries, they do not deepen into any particular country and, therefore, they do not analyze 
regional differences inside each nation. 
  In Chile, Liu (1991) analyzes firm demography to link entry-exit patterns to productivity, 
covering the period 1979-86. She wants to prove that competitive pressures really force inefficient 
producers  to  shut  down.  Thus,  applying  econometric  techniques  from  the  efficiency  frontiers 
literature, she finds that competitive pressures force less efficient producers to fail more frequently 
than others. These gains suggest that microeconomic reforms -trade liberalization, privatization and 
market deregulation- have been effective in promoting efficiency improvements in the manufacturing 
sector. Similar results for Colombia are found by Eslava et al. (2005) over the period 1982-1998. They 
conclude that higher productivity, higher demand and lower input prices increase the probability of 
plant survival. Besides, they also find that trade liberalization increased plant exit, while other reforms 
decreased it. 
  As for Argentina, Castillo et al. (2002) study the evolution of industrial employment over the 
period 1995-2000. Thus, they analyze rates of employment creation and destruction, which involves 
not only entry and exit of firms, but also performance of survivors in terms of employment. They 
conclude that size, sector and age of the firms explain at least a part of firm performance in terms of 
job creation and destruction. In regard to size, smaller companies have gross rates of creation (24%) 
than tripled those of large companies (7%), and gross destruction rates that doubled them (26% versus 
10%). As for sector, they find strong heterogeneity in firm behavior within the same industry. That is, 
in the same sector at the same time, many firms created jobs and many others destroyed them. Despite 
the more unfavorable activities are Radio, Television And Communication Equipment, Motor Vehicles 
and Textiles, the process of transformation that took place in the industry produce winners and losers 
in terms of employment generation in most economic sectors. Finally, firm age is also determinant: 
there is strong evidence of an inverse relationship between age of firms and gross flows (creation and 
job destruction) and the rate of job rotation. As the age increases, all these rates decrease. Besides, 
they also show significant behavior heterogeneity that can not be captured from the aggregated level 
of analysis, since in the same sector and at the same time, coexists job creation and destruction.  
  More recently, Castillo et al. (2006) perform a descriptive analysis of firm demography and 
firm performance -specially as regards the impact on employment-. They examine entry and exit rates 
for  every  economic  activity  and  compare  two  periods:  1996-1998  and  2003-2005.  Firstly,  they 
highlight the importance of the economic cycle in the processes of firm demography. They also stress 
that the period 2003-2005 shows a growth pattern which is different from the previous expansionary - 50 - 
period (1996-1998), with a large number of new firms in all sectors: industry, commerce and services. 
This could be due to the change in relative prices -high real exchange rate-, which induces both an 
increase in the production of commodities as well as in industrial goods. However, they show that 
relative prices are not determinant. Despite at the sectoral level there is an increase in the rate of entry 
in activities favored by the new relative prices, entries focus on industries with lower barriers to entry. 
  Secondly, they verify a significant degree of heterogeneity and a high correlation between 
entry and exit within the same industry. This is why they argue that microeconomic factors -cost and 
demand conditions, barriers to entry, sunk costs, concentration level, learning effects and technical 
change- might have been also relevant in Argentina. However, they do not identify or analyze these 
factors.  
 
2.3. Firm demography in Argentina 
 
  While Argentinian production structure is the result of processes that begin around the 30s, the 
current configuration is primarily due to new economic conditions prevailing since the 90s and the 
changes in recent years. In the nineties, along with the Convertibility Program, which establishes a 
system of fixed exchange rates between local currency and the U.S. Dollar, there are several structural 
reforms in the institutional and regulatory  framework, which involve a radical reduction of tariff 
protection,  a  massive  privatization  of  services  and  market  deregulation
53.  These  reforms,  plus  a 
significant process of labor flexibility, cause the exit of many firms -specially the smaller ones, which 
cannot afford the new conditions- as well as the entry of other ones. 
  Following Kosacoff et al. (2000); Schvarzer (1997), Gatto and Ferraro (1997) and Yoguel 
(2000), the most significant changes in manufacturing in this period are: a) vertical disintegration of 
the processes, which has consolidated the pattern of production specialization of the 80s, oriented to 
natural  resources  and  commodities,  b)  increased weight  of  foreign  direct investment, c)  a  strong 
concentration process, induced by mergers and acquisitions; d) a increasing inter and intra sectoral 
structural heterogeneity; e) a larger weight of imports in domestic supply, which affects the production 
of durable goods and goods that are diffusers of technical progress; f) reduced rate of value added and 
greater capital intensity of production functions; g) the increasing adoption of technology products 
from external sources close to the technological frontier; h) diffusion of soft innovations; i) loss of 
importance of the linkages with local suppliers and subcontractors of capital goods and j) growing 
importance of internationalization strategies, but concentrated in a relatively small number of agents. 
Firm strategies to adapt to this new context are very different, and the significant increase in overall 
productivity is the result of the coexistence of two different situations: the offensive strategies of some 
                                                 
53 The process of market deregulation abolished many entry and exit barriers. - 51 - 
firms along with the defensive restructuring of other ones
54.  
  During this period, there is a significant growth in GDP, which reaches its peak in 1998, when 
a deep recession begins
55. Thus, the entry rate reduces permanently from 9.5% in 1996 to reach a 
minimum of 5.6% in 2002 (Castillo et al., 2006). Unlike previous periods, the adaptability of firms to 
this scenario does not necessarily has to do with the industry in which they operate, but rather with 
their  individual  characteristics  (Castillo  et  al.,  2002).  In  late  2001,  internal  economic  crisis  is 
exacerbated by the breakdown of the convertibility regime. The devaluation of local currency -more 
than 200%-, plus the shrinkage of domestic demand and the lack of credit, result in a significant 
increase in the levels of firm indebtedness and a significant number of closures.  
  Since 2003, macroeconomic stability, sustained high real exchange rate and the stimulated 
growth of aggregate demand settle down the base conditions to start a new growth process. Besides, 
the international context is also favorable: sustained demand, high prices for primary commodities and 
low interest rates (Fernández Bugna and Porta, 2008). Furthermore, devaluation implies the reduction 
of labor costs, which allows the reconstruction of the operating margins of firms. During this period, 
the birth of new firms is intense: entry rate is about 10.7% in 2003 and reaches its maximum of 14.6% 
in 2004. (Castillo et al., 2006).  
  Unlike the previous decade, manufacturing is one of the most dynamic sectors regarding the 
generation of new jobs and the absorption of existing unemployment (Fernández Bugna and Porta, 
2008).  Nevertheless,  a  process  of  structural  change  in  this  sector  is  not  registered:  for  example, 
Castillo  et  al.  (2006)  show  that  new  relative  prices  are  not  enough  to  substantially  modify  the 
traditional structure of births. That is because firm´s capacity of reaction to the new conditions is 
strongly conditioned to the experience of disarticulation and crisis undergone in the preceding decade. 
 
2.4. Lines of research and objectives 
 
  This section outlines the objectives and main lines of research that will be developed in the 
next three years. Thus, three different proposals are briefly exposed: a) Spatial issues on entry and 
exit; b) Spatial issues on firm survival and c) Spatial issues on firm performance. Then, the first line of 
research is described in an initial proposal for the first research paper. It is divided into two parts: a 
descriptive analysis about regional differences on firm demography in Argentina and a project that 
                                                 
54 The  so-called  offensive  strategies  consist  of  the  accomplishment  of  strong  investments  in  machinery  and 
equipment and deep organizational changes, while the defensive ones are based on the expulsion of employment 
and  the  realization  of  particular  investments.  Kosacoff  (1998)  identifies  near  400  companies  with  offensive 
strategies, capable of reaching productivity levels close to the best international standards. They represent about 
40% of industrial output in 1995. He also reveals the presence of 25.000 companies, that represent the rest 60% of 
the industrial product, characterized by the development of defensive strategies. Despite these ones raise their 
productivity level with respect to past, they are away from the international frontier.  
55 The GDP decreases about 4% between 1998 and 2000. - 52 - 
involves an econometric specification.  
 
2.4.1. Three lines of future research 
 
  The thesis will analyze firm demography in Argentina, which constitutes a clear novelty inside 
the empirical literature. As outlined in Section 2.1, firm demography may acquire particular features 
depending  on  the  degree  of  development  of  each  country  and  results  may  differ  among  them. 
However, literature has centered in cases as Europe, North America or Japan, with very few empirical 
contributions  regarding  countries  out  of  these  areas.  Besides,  since  Argentinian  provinces  differ 
significantly in terms of mean wage, skill manufacturing activity, economic growth and other factors, 
the spatial issue is a central factor to be considered. To our knowledge, such a study has not yet been 
done. 
  The first line of research will be developed afterwards. Its main purpose is to explore the 
determinants of firm entry and exit in Argentinian provinces. The second line consists in exploring the 
determinants of firm survival, following a similar approach and methodology. In both cases, the data 
of firm demography come from the Employment and Business Dynamics Observatory (Observatorio 
de Empleo y Dinámica Empresarial, OEDE) from the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social 
Security (Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social, MTESS), while the data about regional 
and sectoral variables come from different sources, described in Section 2.5. Finally, last line of 
research  aims  to  explain  differences  in  regional  firm  performance.  In  this  case,  panel  data  from 
Fundación Observatorio PyME and repeated cross section data from MAPA PyME will be used (see 
Section 2.5). Thus, in the three papers, we should be able to identify the influences on the success, 
failure and survival of newly founded establishments that are specific to the particular industry, region 
and period of time. 
 
2.4.2. Spatial issues on firm entry and exit in Argentina: Descriptive analysis 
 
  Since the main objective of the thesis is to analyze spatial differences in firm demography it is 
necessary to evaluate first the magnitude of such differences and to summary them in some way. Thus, 
we propose a initial descriptive analysis, which will describe: a) regional heterogeneity in a somewhat 
static  analysis  and  b)  the  evolution  of  regional  heterogeneity,  assessing  whether  the  regional 
differences increase or decrease. 
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Regional heterogeneity: questions and objectives 
 
  We expect to be able to answer the following questions regarding to regional heterogeneity: 
1.  Is there heterogeneity among Argentinian provinces in terms of: 
- firm entry and exit rates
56? 
- registered employment per capita or share of registered employment on total employment
57?  
- impact of entry on total wage employment? -penetration entry rate-  
- firm mobility to other size stratum
58?  
2.  Is this heterogeneity related to the industrial specialization in each province? Is it related to 
current industrial production regimes
59? 
 
  Thus, we pursue the following objectives, referred to the initial and the last year of the period 
(2003-2008) and to industrial, commerce and service firms:  
1.  Describing, assessing and explaining the degree of regional heterogeneity in relation to: 
- firm entry and exit rates; 
- registered employment per capita or share of registered employment on total employment;  
- impact of employment generated by entries on the total wage employment;  
- firm mobility to other size stratum. 
2.  Building  typologies  of  entrepreneurial  behavior,  that  is,  grouping  provinces  with  similar 
behavior in terms of firm demography. For example, provinces with low mobility and low growth, 
provinces with high mobility and low growth, provinces with high mobility and growth, provinces 
with high growth and low mobility.  
3.  Building typologies of firm mobility and compare them with regional profiles of industrial 
specialization. 
 
Evolution of regional heterogeneity: questions and objectives 
 
  The aim is analyzing the evolution of the gap of different indicators for each province in 
                                                 
56 Entry and exit rates will be calculated following the different approaches exposed in Section 1.2: a) the one 
related to labor market, b) the one related to the population, c) and the ecological approach. Thus, we will be able 
to asses whether the results vary depending on the approach used.  
57 In Argentina, the share of registered employment may be used as a proxy of the degree of regional development. 
58 Firm mobility will be assessed through transition matrix, that is, tables that show -for each region- the share of 
firms that are small (medium/large) in the initial year and remain in the same stratum in the last year of the period, 
the share that become medium (small/large) an the share that become large (small/medium).  
59 There are five Argentinian provinces favored by these regimes: San Juan, San Luis, Catamarca, La Rioja and 
Tierra del Fuego. This national economic policy, aimed at encouraging the establishment of industries in certain 
regions, is regulated by Law 22.021 and Decree 804/96, and it is based on tax deferments and exemptions for 
investments in factories located in these regions.  - 54 - 
relation to one or more provinces taken as a reference, that is, whether the gap increases or decreases. 
In this case, the evolution will be assessed between the initial and the last year of the period 2003-
2008 -what is called the growth period- and between 1996-2001 -which is called the convertibility 
period-. Once again, it will refer to industrial, commerce and service firms. Some indicators that might 
be used are: 
  - Registered employment on total employment 
  - Registered employment on total population  
- Amount of registered wages per capita, as a proxy for productivity
60.  
 
  We expect to be able to answer, among others, the following questions: 
1.  How did the gap between different provinces evolve in the convertibility period as well as in 
the growth period? Does economic growth tend to increase or to diminish the gap?  
2.  How do the processes of firm demography operate for this to happen? For instance, how did 
entry and exit evolve by size stratum? 
3.  How  did  the  processes  related  to  firm  demography  evolve  in  the  successful  cases?  Is  it 
possible to recognize other determinants?  
 
  Thus, we pursue the following objectives: 
1.  Identifying, describing and explaining the evolution of the gap between provinces regarding to 
the following indicators: 
- Registered employment on total employment; 
- Registered employment on total population; 
- Amount of registered wages per capita. 
2.  Describing and explaining the evolution of these gaps.  
3.  Building typologies of heterogeneity evolution and comparing them with regional profiles of 
industrial specialization. 
 
2.4.3. Spatial issues on firm entry and exit in Argentina: Econometric specification 
 
  The objective is to explore the determinants of firm entry and exit in Argentinian provinces. 
Panel data -from 2003 to 2008- will be used to estimate the determinants of firm entry and exit in each 
province, according to: i) sectoral variables; and ii) characteristics of the territories - unemployment, 
industry growth, human capital, entrepreneurial attitude, specialization index, population density, etc.-. 
                                                 
60 The indicator could be: (employees region i / population region i) * (average salary of employees region i / 
Average wage employees). Collective bargaining could distort this measure, since some groups of workers may 
have higher minimum wages without having therefore a higher productivity. - 55 - 
A similar analysis may be carried out for the period 1996-2001, which is very different in regard to 
macroeconomic conditions. Results may be compared as well.  
  Panel data estimation has been used in recent literature on firm demography (Gaygisiz and 
Köksal,  2003;  Kangasharju,  2000),  and  one  of  its  main  advantages  is  that  non-observable 
heterogeneity can be controlled. According to the working plan exposed in Section 2.6., the exact 
specification,  the  statistical  contrasts  and  the  econometric  methodology  -which  include  whether 
estimate through fixed or random effects, the evaluation of specification errors and the inclusion of 
latent variables- are included in Phase 2 of the project. Besides, as Audretsch and Fritsch (1999) point 
out, each regional variable may impact differently in the startup activity across industries. Thus, it is 
necessary to analyze how to control for the industry when linking the influence of geographic specific 
characteristics  to  new-firm  startup  activity.  That  is,  we  have  to  figure  out  which  of  the  models 
proposed in Section 1.7.4 will be used. 
  An alternative to the regional approach is the urban-size approach, which is based on the 
assumption that external economies are not homogeneously distributed in the regions, but are instead 
related to urban size (Arauzo and Teruel, 2005). However, in spite of its relevance, the data required to 
carry out a similar research are not available at the time of this writing.   
   
2.5. The available statistical sources 
 
  Information about start-ups and their survival is generated by the Employment and Business 
Dynamics Observatory (Observatorio de Empleo y Dinámica Empresarial, OEDE) from the Ministry 
of  Labor,  Employment  and  Social  Security  (Ministerio  de  Trabajo,  Empleo  y  Seguridad  Social, 
MTESS). The data cover all private sector firms with at least one employee and are available at two-
digit industry detail and one-letter services detail, for all Argentinian provinces
61 (23) and Capital 
Federal. This accounts for about 40% of the total employment in Argentina -the rest 60% corresponds 
to  public  and  informal  employment-.  Though,  registered  private  sector  is  the  one  with  higher 
productivity.  It represents the most up-to-date, comprehensive, reasonably  long-term and spatially 
disaggregated data source currently available for firm demography studies. Besides, this database 
identifies changes in the firm codes that do not reflect market entries and exits. That is, spurious 
entries and exits are identified through a procedure called "tracking employment", which consist of 
identifying the displacement of the whole personnel from firms that “exit” to “new” firms. 
  We count with aggregated data of firm entry, exit and incumbents, divided into: a) 4 sizes -
large, medium, small and micro-, b) 50 economic activities -from industry, commerce and services-, c) 
                                                 
61 Buenos Aires Province is disaggregated into Conurbano Bonaerense and Rest.  - 56 - 
25  geographical  areas,  d)  local/non-local  firms
62.  For  each  category  we  have  information  about 
number of firms and the employees they represent, quarterly, from 2003 to 2008. This implies a total 
of 43.560 records
63.  
  On  the  other  hand,  information  about  employment  and  qualification  is  taken  from  the 
Household Permanent Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, EPH), performed by the National 
Institute  of  Statistics  and  Census  (Instituto  Nacional  de  Estadísticas  y  Censos,  INDEC).  Other 
indicators are based on publications of public and private institutions, such as Argentinian Industrial 
Union (Unión Industrial Argentina, UIA), regional statistical bureaus, National Census, among others. 
  Besides, information about regional differences in firm performance, as well as the strategies 
of the firms, is from Fundación Observatorio PyME
64. Despite some questions may vary among the 
different questionnaires, panel data over the period 2004-2007 are available. They are referred to 
industrial  firms  between  10  and  200  employees.  The  forms  include  information  about  general 
characteristics of the firm, quality certifications, problems and expectations, investment, innovation 
and technology, performance, human resources, financing, accounting data and public policy. The 
sample is representative at regional and sectoral level. 
  Finally, the survey called MAPA PyME is undertaken, since 2003, by the Subsecretary for 
Small and Medium Enterprises and Regional Development (Subsecretaría de la Pequeña y Mediana 
Empresa y Desarrollo Regional, SEPYME) and it aims to provide dynamic qualitative as well as 
quantitative information about SMEs. The survey inquires -twice a year- about issues such as number 
of employees, investment, financing, income and expenses, production capacity, foreign trade and 
public  policy.  In  some  periods  it  also  includes  some  special  chapters  about  technology,  training, 
quality  certifications,  environment,  corporate  social  responsibility,  research  and  development  and 
innovation. The following firms have not been included: plants that belong to large firms, foreign 
groups,  non-profit  institutions,  auxiliary  units,  public  sector,  farming  activities,  fishing,  mining, 
electricity and gas, construction and the sectors which have more than 90% of firms with less than 5 
employees. The country is divided into 41 geographical regions and the sample is representative at the 
regional level as well as at each activity defined as relevant in each region. Since the survey aims to 
provide information about the economic activities that are considered a priori as more relevant in each 
region, the regional samples may not be homogeneous in terms of the detail of the activities.  
 
 
                                                 
62 A local firm/plant is that one that operates in the same province in which it was founded. On the contrary, a non-
local firm/plant operates in a province which is different from its birth province. It may be a relocalization or a 
plant that belongs to a another firm. 
63 Similar information over the period 1996-2001 will be available as well. 
64 This is a nonprofit organization founded by the Università di Bologna, Techint Organization and the Argentine 
Industrial Union. Its aims is to collect updated information on small and medium enterprises and to develop 
proposals for decisions on public policy and private action. <http://www.observatoriopyme.org.ar> - 57 - 
2.6. Working plan 
 
  We plan to perform one paper for every year of thesis, following the lines of research exposed 
in Section 2.3. Each one will be divided into three phases, which are detailed in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1: WORKING PLAN 
 
Activities-Tasks                         //                                   Month  O  N  D  E  F  M  A  M  J  J  A  S 
FIRST PHASE: Construction of the analytical frame 
Literature review (theoretical framework)  X  X                     
Literature review (modelling)  X  X  X  X  X               
Literature review (applications)  X  X  X  X  X               
Search of statistical sources  X  X  X  X  X  X             
SECOND PHASE: Contrast of assumptions and design of applications 
Descriptive analysis      X  X  X  X  X           
Design and elaboration of the statistical contrasts            X  X  X  X       
Design and elaboration of the econometric methodology.              X  X  X  X     
Construction of the data bases.                X  X  X     
THIRD PHASE: Results, extensions and implications of political economy  
Estimation and evaluation of the specifications                  X  X  X   
Analysis of the results and implications of political economy                  X  X  X   
Diffusion of the results                    X  X  X 
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Annex 1: Survival rate across countries and industries 
 
  Table A comes from Bartelsman et al. (2004) and provides details on the survival rates at age 
four across industries and countries of Latin America. The first column presents the cross-country 
average survival rate for each industry; the second and third columns report the deviations from this 
average for industrial and other countries respectively; while the other columns present the deviations 
for  each  country  individually.  Notably,  there  is  variation  even  across  Latin  American  countries. 
Besides, shaded cells indicate that Argentinian sectoral survival rate is in many cases more similar to 
industrial countries than to the other ones. 
 
TABLE A: SURVIVAL RATE (4 YEARS OF AGE) ACROSS COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES  
(AS A RATIO TO CROSS-COUNTRY SECTORAL AVERAGE) 
 
  Cross 
country 
average 
Industrial 
countries 
Other 
countries 
Argentina  Chile  Colombia  Mexico 
Mining And Quarrying   0.69   1.05   0.94    0.84   s/d  s/d  0.69 
Total Manufacturing   0.67   1.00   1.00   0.89   1.04   0.87  0.76 
Food Products, Beverages And Tobacco   0.69   1.02   0.98   0.86   1.03   0.95   0.80 
Textiles, Textile Products, Leather And 
Footwear 
 0.59   0.96   1.03   0.91   1.08   0.87   0.80 
Wood And Products Of Wood And Cork   0.64   1.04   0.97   0.83   1.13   0.77   0.69 
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of 
Recorded Media 
 0.69   0.98   1.01   0.93   1.09   1.02  0.77 
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And 
Nuclear Fuel 
 0.73   1.05   0.96   0.83   0.93   1.11   0.92 
Chemicals And Chemical Products   0.69   1.02   0.99   1.02   1.00   1.00  0.86 
Rubber And Plastics Products   0.73   0.98   1.01   0.94   1.02   0.90  0.81 
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products   0.68   1.02   0.98   0.89   0.98   0.83  0.74 
Basic Metals   0.69   0.99   1.01   0.90   1.13   0.92  0.78 
Fabricated Metal Products, Except 
Machinery And Equipment 
 0.69   1.01   0.99   0.85   1.00   0.82  0.70 
Machinery And Equipment, N.E.C.   0.73   1.01   0.99   0.86   0.97   0.75  s/d 
Office, Accounting And Computing 
Machinery 
 0.70   0.88   1.10   0.60   1.42   1.42  s/d 
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus, Nec   0.74   0.93   1.06   0.93   1.14   0.98  s/d 
Radio, Television And Communication 
Equipment 
 0.71   0.92   1.08   0.86   1.06   1.04  s/d 
Medical, Precision And Optical Instruments   0.77   0.96   1.04   0.99   1.04   0.81  s/d 
Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi-Trailers   0.70   0.99   1.01   0.95   0.96   0.83  0.81 
Other Transport Equipment   0.65   0.98   1.01   0.83   0.88   0.88  0.76 
Manufacturing Nec- Recycling   0.66   1.02   0.98   0.89   1.07   0.78  0.70 
Electricity, Gas And Water Supply   0.82   1.01   0.99   0.95  s/d  s/d   0.88 
Construction   0.64   1.07   0.94   0.66  s/d  s/d   0.32 
Market Services   0.66   1.02   0.98   0.89  s/d  s/d   0.73 
Wholesale And Retail Trade- Restaurants 
And Hotels 
 0.64   1.02   0.98   0.87  s/d  s/d   0.74 
Transport And Storage And Communication   0.66   0.98   1.02   0.98  s/d  s/d   0.78 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate And 
Business Services 
 0.70   1.01   0.99   0.91  s/d  s/d   0.75 
Total non-agricultural business sector   0.65   1.02   0.99   0.88  1.07  0.90  0.67 
Source: own elaboration based on Bartelsman et al. (2004) 
 